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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF 
IMMIGRATION 
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opinion, member state preferences 
 
 
Turkey’s success in the membership negotiations is linked to its commitment to the 
Copenhagen criteria and its capacity to implement the acquis. However, the economic 
and political development in Turkey, improvement in respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, namely full convergence with the European acquis, is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for membership. Turkey’s membership includes 
other aspects which make the accession problematic. Immigration is such an area where 
economic, cultural, and security related concerns of the European public as well as 
leaders come to the fore; where the rhetoric of both illustrates the opposition sentiments 
towards accession. Since Turkey is a large, populated and predominantly Muslim 
country, the prevailing sentiment of a mass flow of Turks after membership and their 
negative impact on the labour markets, European culture, and internal security leads to 
hesitancy towards Turkey’s accession in the member states. European leaders often use 
this public concern for an exodus of a large Turkish population to mobilize the public, 
and they refer to public opposition to immigration when discussing Turkey’s 
membership. The debates on the application of free movement for Turkish labour also 
reflect other issues of the European societies such as unemployment, the integration of 
the immigrants, and the need for finding effective solutions to the aging European 
population. Therefore, European leaders have been restrained by both the demands of 
the public and the markets while taking steps on Turkey’s EU membership. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NE KATILIMI: GÖÇÜN OLASI ROLÜ 
 
 
 
GURBET DENİZ YAVUZ 
 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2007 
 
 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: göç, kişilerin serbest dolaşımı, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Üyeliği, 
kamuoyu, üye devletlerin tercihleri 
 
 
Türkiye’nin üyelik müzakereleri sürecinde başarısı Kopenhag Kriterleri’ni yerine 
getirmesine ve Avrupa Birliği müktesebatını uygulamasına bağlıdır. Ancak; 
Türkiye’deki ekonomik ve siyasi gelişmeler, insan haklarına ve temel özgürlüklere 
saygının artması, yani Türkiye’nin müktesebata tam uyum sağlaması üyelik için gerekli 
bir koşuldur ama yeterli değildir. Türkiye’nin üyeliği, katılımı sorunlu hale getiren 
başka boyutlar da içermektedir. Göç, Avrupa halkının ve liderlerinin ekonomik, kültürel 
ve güvenlik konularında endişelerinin ortaya çıktığı ve her ikisinin de üyeliğe karşıt 
söylemini gösteren bir alandır. Türkiye’nin, çoğunluğu Müslüman olan büyük bir 
nüfusa sahip olması, üyelikten sonra Türklerin toplu olarak göç edeceği ve Avrupa 
piyasalarını, kültürünü ve hatta iç güvenliğini olumsuz yönde etkileyeceği inancına ve 
dolayısıyla üye devletlerde Tükiye’nin üyeliğine karşı tereddüte yol açmaktadır. Avrupa 
liderleri halkın bu tereddütünü onları mobilize etmek için sık sık kullanır, ve 
karşılığında Avrupalı liderler Türkiye’nin üyeliği hakkındaki konuşmalarında halkın 
göçe karşıt olmasına atıfta bulunurlar. Üyelikten sonra Türklere serbest dolaşım 
hakkının verilmesi üzerine yapılan tartışmalar aynı zamanda Avrupa’nın işsizlik, 
göçmenlerin entegrasyonu, ve yaşlanan Avrupa nüfusunun demografik sorunlarına etkili 
çözümler bulma ihtiyacı gibi diğer sorunlarınının göç üzerinde yansımasını da gösterir. 
Bu nedenle, Avrupalı liderler, Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği için adım atarken, Avrupa 
halkının ve piyasaların ihtiyacı konularında bağlanmış durumdadır. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in its 
December 2004 summit and membership negotiations were opened on October 3, 2005. 
However, it took roughly eight months to open the negotiations of the chapters on 
which screening is completed. This was regarded as a historical moment in Turkey-EU 
relations in the sense that the promises of Europe for Turkey in the way of its accession 
seem to be closer to reality than it had ever been. However, although it is certain that 
Europe gave a very crucial decision by moving beyond the longest standing association 
agreement in the EU enlargement history, Turkey is on the edge of a long accession 
process which seems to be tough and problematic.  
 This thesis deals with one of the issues between Turkey and the EU in this 
problematic process and argues that possible immigration from Turkey in case of EU 
membership is a major obstacle to Turkey’s accession. The literature on the 
immigration issue between Turkey and the EU generally focuses on the migration 
trends in Turkey, migrant Turks in Europe, and the immigration policies of the 
European member states including the justice and home affairs issues of the EU. The 
topic of this thesis is a relatively unstudied one since it examines the immigration issue 
from the European side with member state preferences and the public opinion. 
Moreover, it tries to understand how both regard the immigration of Turkish people 
from an economic, social and security point of view. Hence the thesis finds out how the 
cost and benefit considerations of the EU becomes an obstacle in the Turkey’s accession 
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process. Therefore the thesis will be a contribution to the literature on the immigration 
issue between Turkey and the EU. 
 Considering all the costs of Turkey’s membership, the ideas that oppose 
Turkey’s accession and the problems of the accession process, it is worth to focus on 
one of the issues to examine it deeply. As a result, this study will focus on the debates, 
hesitancies and doubts of the public and the leaders of the member states about the free 
movement issue if and when Turkey becomes an EU member, since the public and the 
leaders are not mutually exclusive. It is crucial to study the immigration debate because 
of various reasons. First immigration has economic, social and political implications for 
both sides which are important for the furtherance of the relationship between Turkey 
and the EU. Second, it is one of the most debated issues by the European public and 
European decision makers and is generally referred in the discussions that oppose 
membership. Third it is an issue that is very much used by the European elite for 
popular means. Fourth, freedom of movement is still an uncompleted issue between 
Turkey and Europe since the 1963 Association Agreement that envisaged the extension 
of the free movement rights to Turkey by the European Community at different stages.  
 Immigration is a two-sided sensitive issue in the sense that on the one hand there 
is a great fear in some of the member states because of the idea that Turkey’s accession 
will lead to large-scale immigration which would cause serious disturbances on the 
European labour markets, social welfare structure, European values and cultural 
identity, on the other hand restriction of the free movement of people would make 
Turkey a second-class member as stated by the Turkish leaders. Therefore, this thesis 
focuses on the immigration issue in terms of the application of free movement of people 
principle in case of membership. It aims to find an answer for the question that how the 
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possible immigration of Turkish labour becomes an obstacle for Turkey’s membership 
with respect to the ideas and assumptions of the EU member countries.  
According to intergovernmentalist logic, enlargement of the Union for the most 
part depends on the material benefits of the member states. Therefore perceptions of 
costs and benefits of the membership of a country shape the decisions of the member 
states. Thus, Turkey’s accession from the migration perspective is a main issue around 
which member state preferences and the public opinion are formulated. As the accession 
negotiations began, possible impact of Turkey on the Union has been much more 
debated and the idea of massive migration from Turkey to the more developed EU 
member states has become apparent in the statements that oppose the enlargement. The 
arrival of the Turkish labour to the EU member states is seen as a threat because of the 
idea that immigrants take jobs of the national workers, replace them and cause further 
unemployment or they may not get any jobs but become dependent on the government 
by being an underclass who benefit from the social security structure of the welfare 
states. Keeping in mind the unemployment problem in Europe, letting Turks to move 
and work in Europe rise the anxiety of the European residents who seek for economic 
and social benefits and may not want to share these rights with the new comers.
 Immigration of Turkish labour can also be examined from the sociological 
institutionalist perspective with regard to the impact of the immigration on the European 
way of life and culture. Sociological institutionalists argue that the collective identity, 
shared norms, and values affect the preferences of the member states with regard to the 
enlargement process. It is undeniable that flow of Turkish people to the EU countries is 
one of the biggest concerns of the EU counties where the public fears that immigration 
will boost unemployment, decrease wages, lead to social and political upheavals. 
According to sociological institutionalism identity rather than the material costs and 
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benefits of the immigration becomes the determining factor for accession. Immigration 
is an issue where this identity perspective comes to the ground. Therefore different 
cultural characteristics and Islamic disposition of Turkish people create a fear for the 
Europeans since Turkish immigrants are thought to affect the European way of life and 
culture which are seen as different from the Turkish way of life and culture. Moreover, 
the idea of accepting Muslim immigrants creates tensions in the society with regard to 
the security issue as a result of the violent attacks by the Muslims in Europe.  Turkey’s 
image very much revolves around the image that the minorities present for Europe 
considering the already existing Turkish or other Muslim minorities in European 
societies. Therefore, all the economic and social problems that the minorities have with 
the rest of the society, become a clue for the possibly upcoming problems of the 
European societies. 
Therefore from the cost and benefit analysis, immigration of Turkish people can 
be considered as a cost because of the idea that immigration may cause loss of jobs and 
may increase expenditure of the government for the social benefits, may harm the 
European identity and the cultural values, and may put the internal security in danger. It 
can be also considered as a potential benefit since Turkish immigration may provide 
human resources to fill skill shortages, keep economic growth because of the declining 
population rates of Europe, and mean the enrichment of the European culture by the 
different values that it would bring. Considering the big and increasing population of 
Turkey which is predominantly Muslim and keeping in mind the problems of Europe to 
integrate the immigrants, as well as the perception about the Islam in the European 
countries, Turkey’s accession becomes problematic. Therefore, it is important to find 
out whether the expected thing will happen, there will be a large-scale of immigration, 
and whether the claims of many Europeans about the negative consequences are 
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sensible considering the age structure of Europe. However, since migration is a 
politically and economically sensitive issue in the member states, it is possible that free 
movement of people will not be allowed at the time of accession, but there would be a 
period of transition for Turkey and the EU to get prepared for the negative causes of 
immigration. In the 2004 enlargement, a flexible transition period up to 7 years was 
allowed for the Central and Eastern European workers. EU may keep a permanent 
safeguard that will allow the EU member countries to keep Turkish workers out if there 
is an estimated negative impact on their labour markets.  
 This thesis is composed of four main chapters besides the introduction as the 
first and the conclusion as the last chapters. Second chapter deals with the EU’s position 
on immigration with regard to the general EU policies on immigration, explains how the 
free movement of people principle, permanent safeguards, and transitional arrangements 
work in the EU. Subsequently, it explains 2004 enlargement to the Central and Eastern 
European states as a past experience of the application of the free movement of persons 
and the transitional arrangements to the new comers by different member states. The 
2004 enlargement presents us an example of the application of the transitional measures 
and the estimated economic impacts of the immigration on the existing members with 
the already attained results which were stated in the March 2006 Commission report. 
Moreover, the 2004 enlargement gives a clue about the attitude of the member states 
towards the free movement of persons issue under the economic pressure of the labour 
markets and the suggestions of the European Commission.   
 Third chapter includes the EU member states’ preferences towards the free 
movement of Turkish people after the accession. Firstly, theoretical discussion is given 
to understand the reasons behind the opposition to Turkey’s accession and the free 
movement of Turks with regard to costs and benefit considerations of the member states 
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in terms of the impact of the immigrants. The preferences of the member states are 
explained with five cases: Germany, Austria, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and France 
where the potential impact of the flow of Turkish people is taken into consideration 
from the economic, cultural, and security related concerns. 
 Fourth chapter comprises the European public opinion on the immigration issue 
and its reflection in the society from xenophobia to racism as well as the debate on the 
success of the multicultural society. In the beginning of the chapter, it is explained to 
what extent the public opinion matters in the European decision making process. In the 
subsequent part of this chapter, the concerns of the public on the immigration of Turks 
are explained with reference to the domestic situation in the member states from 
unemployment to the perceptions of the immigrant Turks and Muslims. In order to learn 
the public opinion, recent Eurobarometer surveys which questioned the support for 
Turkey’s accession and immigration related issues are chosen. 
 The fifth chapter explains the possible migratory flows from Turkey to the EU 
member states in case of the membership with the econometric studies of the scholars in 
order to understand whether the fears of the leaders and the European public are 
unfounded or in contrast Europe will face a mass flow of Turks. The chapter takes the 
provision of free movement rights to Turks from the historical perspective; later 
presents the projections on Turkish immigration with possible migratory flows and 
questions if the young and growing Turkish population can be a remedy to the problems 
of the ageing European population.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON IMMIGRATION: PAST  
EXPERIENCES FOR FUTURE PROSPECTS 
 
 
 
This chapter deals with the stance of the European Union and member states on the 
immigration issue with regard to granting EU citizens free movement rights within the 
enlarged Union. In this context, the accession of the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) is studied with a reference to the application of transitional 
arrangements and the safeguard clauses in order to restrict free movement. The EU 
stance with regard to the 2004 enlargement and granting new member workers free 
movement rights sheds lights on how the EU shapes its position on the Turkish 
immigration issue in the case of Turkey’s membership. The 2004 enlargement therefore 
presents us a historic example where the free movement rights of the workers can be 
suspended and member states apply either national measures within the specified period 
or Community measures under the guidance of the Commission. Two main points arise 
with the eastern enlargement: firstly, immigration has been less than expected. 
Secondly, when occurring immigration benefits the host country by filling skill 
shortages, thus contributing to economic growth and helping the host country to deal 
with the illegal work. This positive outcome is seen in the example of the UK, Ireland, 
and Sweden. 
Differences exist between member states on the application of free movement 
rights for the newcomers because the immigration policy is left to the discretion of the 
individual EU members. No supranational immigration policy exists in the EU, but 
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there are general guidelines and member states can decide themselves on what to adopt. 
The EU guarantees the citizens of the member states the same rights by treating them 
equally. The free movement of persons is thus one of the basic principles of the 
European Union. However, the free movement of persons may pose some challenges 
when we talk about the accession of ten new member states with a total population of 
approximately 75 million, who possesses low income level, and relatively low living 
standards. Prior to the accession of 10 new members in 2004, concerns about the costs 
of the enlargement with regard to the free movement of persons have increased. Some 
of the governmental and societal sectors have discussed the possible worker influx of 
the accession states to the EU-15 (EU members before 2004 enlargement) and worried 
that the immigrants could take the jobs and social benefits of the existing workers. 
Considering the low wages and living standards of the new members, and the economic 
and social opportunities in the EU-15, the opponents of the immigration have claimed 
that a disproportionate number of people would move to the EU-15. On the other hand, 
economists have presented various figures and tables to forecast the migration potential 
and argued that after the enlargement, new member immigration would be modest. 
While Britain and Ireland have shown their intentions to open their borders to the 
workers of the CEECs from the beginning of the accession, Germany and Austria 
opposed new comer migration. Under these circumstances, the EU applied transitional 
arrangements for the freedom to move in order to balance both the new member and 
EU-15 demands as well as permit member states prepare for the possible negative 
impacts of the free movement of workers. Transitional arrangements allow the member 
states to restrict the flow of new member nationals, including only workers but not 
students, tourists, and the nationals of Malta and Cyprus. Transitional arrangements 
foresee a gradual opening of borders in seven years at the longest, through three phases. 
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Member states are free to apply national measures or Community measures during these 
periods, or wait until the end of the seven years to open the borders for workers if they 
experience serious difficulties in their labour markets. 
2.1. General EU Policies on Immigration 
2.1.1. Free movement of Persons:  
The Free movement of persons, one of the main pillars of the European Union, is 
considered in two terms within the EU context: firstly granting the right to settle in a 
member country, secondly the right to cross the internal borders within the EU for the 
purpose of travelling without any internal border checks. Free movement for the 
purposes of work and travel within the European Community has been a main goal of 
the Union as envisaged in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 which established the European 
Economic Community. The EEC Regulation 1612/68 states that "mobility of labour 
within the Community must be one of the means by which the worker is guaranteed the 
possibility of improving his living and working conditions and promoting his social 
advancement" (“Free Movement of Persons”, 2007). The free movement of persons 
within the Union is also linked to the basic element of the European Union law: 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality, which was laid down in Article 
12(TEC) and required member states to equally treat the nationals of other members. 
Once a national of a member state is allowed to work in the enlarged Union, 
Community laws apply, such as the right of residence, non-discrimination on the basis 
of nationality, the recognition of qualifications, or the provision of social security. 
However, although right to mobility was drafted in the Treaty of Rome, this goal 
was not achieved until the formation of the Single European Act in 1980s (Dearden, 
1999). There were many barriers to mobility such as passport controls and the 
preferential treatment of the native workers in the employment procedure. The Single 
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European Act requires that four freedoms, the free movement of people, capital, goods, 
and services must be achieved by January 1, 1993 with the “abolishment of any 
restrictions on internal mobility, including internal border controls” (Zimmermann, 
1995:58).  
However, the main step towards a common migration policy for the EU had been 
the Schengen system, which has been developed outside the EU framework.  In 1985 
Germany, France, and Benelux countries signed an intergovernmental agreement for the 
elimination of the internal border checks, unified visa policy, and stronger external 
controls. This agreement that brought the Schengen system came into force in 1995 
with the establishment of a Schengen area that comprises the member states of the EU 
except UK and Ireland and plus the two non-EU countries Norway, and Iceland. With 
the Schengen regime, member states agreed to abolish internal borders controls, 
harmonize controls at the external frontiers of the Schengen area, and apply a common 
visa policy and other supplementary measures such as police and judicial cooperation 
(Jileva, 2002).   
Although the Schengen acquis is binding on the new member states from the date 
of accession, the EU membership does not automatically incorporate the new members 
to the Schengen system. Implementation of the Schengen acquis is conducted in two 
phases. The provisions related to the external border controls, illegal immigration, and, 
to some aspect, police cooperation apply to the member states from the beginning of 
accession. However, the provisions related to the freedom to travel, internal border 
controls, visa policies, and Schengen Information System (SIS) may apply at a later date 
(Byrska, 2004).  
With the inclusion of the internal market objective to the Single European Act, 
new measures were adopted which are imperative for the free movement since one of 
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the main pillars that the SEM rests on is the free movement principle which takes 
account of goods, persons, services and capital between the member states (Nugent, 
2003). Article 8A of the EEC Treaty states that “The internal market shall compromise 
an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.” 
(Nugent, 2003:298). The Treaty provides the right to move for both the employed and 
self-employed people. For the employed, Article 39 of the EC Treaty states that the 
freedom of movement necessitates the “abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the member states with respect to employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.” (Hailbronner, 2005). For 
the self-employed, this right principally relates to the rights of establishment in the other 
member states. 
The EC Treaty, in its origin, regards the individual primarily as an economic 
actor, but the free movement for the asylum seekers, refugees, and displaced people are 
not reflected in the Treaty but incorporated into the legislation by means of the 
Amsterdam Treaty (Baldoni, 2003). Although at the beginning, the right to free 
movement was granted for the European Economic Area (EEA) workers to be 
employed or self-employed, reside in the host country, provide and receive services in 
the EEA, this right has been extended in terms of both its scope and the range of the 
citizens it addressed by secondary legislation and Court rulings. The European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) has played a very important role in extending the scope of the free 
movement from workers to persons since 1968 (ibid). However, the impediments to the 
labour mobility within the EU remained until the introduction of the Common Market in 
1992 (Biffl, 2001). In the years following the establishment of the Common Market, the 
purpose of the Community in terms of the rights of the immigrants has been redefined; 
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the Community has been made more than an economic entity by incorporating social as 
well as economic purposes to its objectives and by treating the nationals as citizens, 
human beings, not just as economic actors (Melis, 2001). First of all, the barriers to 
movement are aimed to be abolished with the mutual recognition of educational and 
other qualifications as well as the provision of training and social facilities such as 
welfare payments (Nugent, 2003). Subsequently the free movement right is granted to 
all various groups of citizens: dependants, pensioners, students, providers, and receivers 
of services and economically non-active persons under certain conditions (Hartley, 
2004). The concept of EU citizenship, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, 
has been developed to include certain rights and duties with the text of the Treaties, 
secondary legislation and especially case law. By means of this citizenship, with regard 
to the immigration rights, the right of the citizens “to move and reside freely on the 
territory of the member states (Art. 18 CE)” is emphasized (Baldoni, 2003:9). As a 
result of attempts to avoid indirect discrimination, some basic social issues such as the 
rights to receive medical treatment in other member states, the social benefits for 
nationals of other member states, and the position of family members of the migrant 
workers have been promoted. 
Furthermore, although Article 12(TEC) states that the rights of the Union citizens 
are subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty, the Court has 
attempted to use citizenship as a tool to expand the rights beyond the economically 
active Union citizens by bringing cases within its reach that would fall outside the scope 
of European law such as the position of the students and of third country nationals 
(Hailbronner, 2005). The ECJ gave substance to the issue of citizenship by extending 
the concept of discrimination and interpreting the previous regulation for a broader 
definition of equal treatment. The value placed upon citizens included persons who are 
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partially dependent upon social welfare as long as they exercise an effective economic 
activity within the scope of the application of the provision. 
However although the nationals of the EU are provided with an extensive scope of 
rights, there are some practical and legal impediments prevent the effective 
implementation of free movement rights in terms of the recognition of qualifications, 
tax arrangements, and social security arrangements. 
2.1.2. Transitional Arrangements: 
The freedom to travel, search and work in another member state is one of the main 
contributions of the EU for its nationals. Enlargement of the Union does not 
automatically bring these rights to the nationals of the new members. The time for the 
application of free movement rights for persons of the new members depends on the 
decision and national measures of the existing member states.  
As seen in the previous enlargements, such as the southern enlargement of the 
EU and the enlargement to the CEECs, a transitional arrangement can be set out to 
delay the granting of this right to the new member state nationals for a specific time 
period to limit their access to the labour markets in a member state (Boeri and Brücker, 
2000). The limitations to the mobility of Spanish and Portuguese labours lasted until the 
completion of the Single Market in 1991. Eastern enlargement exemplifies the 
implementation of derogations for the labour mobility to the new members. Transitional 
arrangements for the freedom to mobility aim gradually bring this right in order to 
prevent the social and economic tensions by giving time to the old member states to 
arrange their social and economic systems for the new comers (Chammartin, Bazaldua, 
2004). Moreover, restriction to labour mobility lets the new members take advantage of 
the membership and decrease the income gap before the opening of the borders to 
prevent the influx of workers to the EU-15 member states (ibid). The restrictions on the 
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free movement apply only to the migrant workers and not other categories of citizens. 
However, the limitation does not mean exemption from the other rights connected to the 
employment such as the equal treatment, indiscrimination with regard to remuneration 
and social and tax advantages, once a migrant had access to the labour market 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006). 
The eastern enlargement of the EU, namely accession of CEES with 75 new 
citizens, explains how the Union extends the free movement rights to the new comers 
and how transitional arrangements function. 
2.2. 2004 Enlargement 
2.2.1. Application of the Free Movement of Persons for the New Comers 
The extension of the free movement rights to the nationals of the new member states 
was debated before the accession of the 10 new member states. The issue was 
complicated because of the necessity to balance the demands of both the old and new 
member states on the one hand and the public on the other hand. During the accession 
negotiations, some member states raised their voices against the opening of their 
borders to the new comers since they thought that the immigration would have negative 
impacts on the labour markets and on the employment conditions (Byrska, 2004). The 
reason they asserted for the hesitancy to open borders was that if the new members were 
given the right to free movement, they would migrate en masse. It is this massive 
migration that many of the nationals of the EU-15 fear. Since an income gap exists 
between the old and new members and an apparent unemployment problem exists in the 
new members, the basis of the fear relies on the possibility of these people to migrate to 
the old members to find a job with a lower remuneration than they could have in their 
home countries. Keeping in mind the structural unemployment in the EU, migration is 
thought to have pressure on the markets, lower wages, even cause further 
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unemployment in the Union (ibid). Not only economic problems but also social 
problems that may occur in case of the immigration have been discussed, such as the 
abuse of the welfare system by the immigrants.  
The immigration issue is also complicated from the new member states’ 
perspective. They faced with the dilemma of a brain drain as a result of immigration, 
but on the other hand, the migration of unemployed population would decrease the 
market pressure of the home country and even contribute to the country’s economic 
development with the remittances that sent to families remaining in the home country.  
As a consequence, the Commission proposed a transitional period up to 7 years 
with the flexible “2 plus 3 plus 2” formula for the workers of the 8 new members. The 
transitional period contains 3 phases which apply different conditions. The first phase of 
the transitional arrangements started on the 1 May 2004 and ended after two years, 30 
April 2006 (Hubert, 2004).  
It is clearly stated in the Act on Accession that the transitional measures only refer 
to the free movement of workers and freedom to provide services and cannot be used to 
limit the free movement rights of students, pensioners, self-employed, self-sufficient 
people, and to the people with the purpose of travel. Moreover the restrictions are not 
applicable to immigrant workers legally employed in the territory of the EU-15 before 
the accession. They are automatically recognized as legal workers with the same rights 
as the nationals of the country and the other citizens: the right to move for family-
reunification, education, and establishing a business (Chammartin, Bazaldua, 2004). 
Free movement also applies to the family members who reside in a member state with 
the worker at the time of accession if the worker is allowed to work in that member state 
for at least 12 months (disregarding the period that he stayed in the state concerned) but 
for the family members admitted after the accession, free movement applies at least 
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after 18 months of their stay or from the third year of the accession (Adinolfi, 2005:487-
488).  For the rest, access to labour markets is restricted. Transitional measures that 
have 3 phases with a 7 years time period at most are set up as follow: 
¾ Period 2004-2006:  For two years the member states that reject to open 
their labour markets apply national measures on access to their labour 
markets or apply the bilateral agreements that they have with the new 
members. (Boeri and Brücker, 2005).   
¾ Period 2006-2009: At the end of the two-year period, the Commission 
releases a report based on the review of the Council on the functioning of 
the transitional arrangements set out in the Accession Treaty. However, 
the result of the report is not binding on the member states. At the end of 
the first phase member states choose whether to apply national measures 
and the measures of the bilateral arrangements after the notification of 
the Commission, or choose to implement the Community rules on the 
free movement of labour. However, within this three-year period, 
member states at any time can inform the Commission and apply the free 
movement of labour provisions. 
¾ Period 2009-2011: Although the application of the Community rules are 
left to the member states, at the end of five years, they should be applied 
under normal conditions. However, the prolongation of the period for 
another two years for the third period is only possible in case of a serious 
disturbance of the labour market. 
The majority of the member states agreed on imposing national measures to the 
workers of the eight members. Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, Luxembourg decided to apply transitional arrangements to 
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limit the labour mobility for the initial phase. However, the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
and Ireland were the three states who opened their borders for the new immigrants with 
the accession. For the first two years, Belgium kept its work permit system which was 
different for salaried workers and temporary workers. Netherlands and Finland also 
applied the work permit system, but the system was more flexible in some of the sectors 
and professions; in all other sectors the post was offered if only nationals of the old 
member states did not take the job (Byrska, 2004). France had a permit policy excluding 
some professional sectors; in Denmark it was necessary to get an official residence 
permit and full-time job; in Italy and Portugal, a work permit scheme was applied with 
the application of a quota system (ibid.). Austria and Germany, who have opposed the 
free movement, apply certain restrictions in some of the cross-border services. Spain, 
Luxembourg, and Greece applied the work permit system for the first period. 
Furthermore, the new member states are allowed to impose reciprocal restrictions on 
workers of the EU-15 member states. 
First phase of the transitional arrangements expired in April 2006; some member 
states nevertheless still continue to apply restrictive measures. However, although in the 
first phase only three member states agreed to open their labour market, this number 
increased to eight with the decision of Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain to 
remove the restrictions at the beginning of the second period which started in 2006. Five 
other countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, and Netherlands, agreed to 
gradually lift the restrictions gradually within three years; that is to say, before the end 
of the second period of the transitional arrangements. Denmark decided to apply a 
flexible procedure for all the sectors in the labour market whereas Belgium, France, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg chose to adopt the procedure for some sectors, especially 
those experiencing labour shortages. Nevertheless, Austria, and Germany, who had 
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raised their voices against the immigration of the nationals of the eastern members from 
the beginning of accession, will continue to keep the restrictions at least until the end of 
the second period in 2009. Germany mentioned its existing unemployment problem in 
the country as a reason to restrict the free movement; Austria cited the forecasts for high 
unemployment in the future as the motivation of the restrictions, besides its proximity to 
the new members (Free Movement of Labour in the EU-25, 2006).   
2.2.1.1.Safeguard clauses 
Cyprus and Malta are not included in the transitional arrangements; free movement of 
the citizens of these two states are allowed after accession, in contrast to process of the 
other new members. The free movement of Cypriot workers is guaranteed in the 
Accession Treaty and in the case of Malta although free movement applies to citizens of 
the latter; there is a possibility of invoking a permanent safeguard clause. (A safeguard 
clause lets the member states that do not apply restrictive measures on the free 
movement of persons, impose new restrictions after the authorisation of the 
Commission if its labour market is intimidated by a serious difficulty.) If the member 
states suffer serious problems on the labour market related to the immigrants or even 
there is a threat of this kind, the Commission decides on the restrictions that can be 
imposed at a later date. This safeguard is only figured for Malta because of the limited 
size of its labour market (Freedom of Movement for Workers after Enlargement, 2006). 
Moreover, Austria and Germany, traditionally the Central and Eastern European 
migrants receiving countries, expressed their anxiety about the negative impacts of 
immigration. Despite applying national restrictions and provisions of bilateral 
agreements between themselves and member states, they also preferred to accept a 
safeguard clause on some of the sectors such as the construction and industrial cleaning 
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to restrict the movement of workers in these areas if the service sectors are negatively 
affected. 
2.2.1.2.Standstill clause 
The standstill clause requires members states not to apply more restrictive policies for 
the movement of workers than it possessed before the sign of the Accession Treaty, 
16April 2003. Moreover when there is a job opportunity for the foreigners in the EU-15, 
the citizens of new members should be given priority over the third nationals.  
As a result, in the Eastern enlargement, the transitional arrangement scheme was 
established in order to gradually open the labour markets in seven years. During this 
period, member states can open the borders to the new comers or maintain restrictions if 
there is a risk of serious disturbances of the immigration on the country, but the 
restrictions should not be stricter than that was applied before the accession. With the 
safeguard clauses, member states that abolished the restrictions on the free movement 
are allowed to impose new restrictions under the authorization of the Commission.   
 
2.2.2. Commission Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements 
for the period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006 
The first phase of the transitional arrangement expired in 2006 and the Commission 
released its report on the functioning of the Transitional Arrangements for the first 
period from 1 May 2004 to 30 April 2006. The Commission report is based on the data 
on residence and work permits, and other figures on the workers that were submitted to 
Eurostat by the member states (Industrial Relations Services, 2006). The European 
Council takes the Commission report as a base while reviewing the functioning of the 
arrangements. The Commission report on the evaluation of the transitional 
arrangements provided information with regard to the functioning of arrangements and 
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helped the member states to decide on the future application of national arrangements or 
Community law on the free movement of people during the second period from 1 May 
2006 to 30 April 2009. As stated in the framework at the end of the phase all member 
states declare their positions on the issue and notify the Commission about their 
intentions for the second phase.   
2.2.2.1.Mobility of workers in the EU-25  
Before the eastern enlargement, the Commission (2003:6), in its midterm review of the 
social policy agenda, stated that:  
   One element that has featured strongly in the public debate on accession is 
labour mobility in an enlarged Europe. Despite the fears, the most likely 
scenario is one in which labour mobility will be moderate to limited and will 
after a likely short upsurge just after the accession period - with some 
250.000 persons per year - start declining again to fall below 100 000 
persons per year before the end of the decade. Past experience shows that 
fears of mobility at previous rounds of enlargement were unfounded. On the 
contrary, the developments in those countries meant that many previous 
migrant workers actually returned to the home country, following EU 
membership. 
 
The Commission repeated the similar statements after the experience of the first phase 
of the transitional arrangements. The Commission’s 2006 report, based on the national 
data received from the member states, affirmed that the mobility flows between the new 
and old members are very limited and most countries experienced lower labour flows 
than expected from the eight new members (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006). The employment rate of the EU-10 nationals in several EU-15 
member states such as Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Austria and Netherlands has 
increased. This growth is due to the increased opportunities for the establishment of 
private business and the changing attitudes of the employers to the nationals of the new 
members (ibid). Although the employment rates of the EU-10 nationals in each member 
state are higher than that of the non-EU nationals in general, there is no surge in the 
number of EU-10 workers in the other EU member states. With the exception of Austria 
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and Ireland, nationals of the EU-10 represented less than 1% of the working age 
population in the member states (Industrial Relations Services, 2006) (See Table 2.1).  
Moreover, since the data received by the Commission includes the residence 
permits, and work permits as well as statistics on workers from other administrative 
data sources such as the social security registers, sometimes presenting the actual 
migration flow in the EU because of the undeclared work is not possible. However, 
enlargement contributed to the declaration of the underground economy in the member 
states where the nationals of the EU-10 legalized their status as a worker after the 
enlargement. This led to positive consequences for the EU-15, such as the greater 
compliance of the workers with legal standards, an increase in the revenue of the states 
with regard to tax and social security contributions, and the improvement of the social 
cohesion by decreasing the marginalization of those in concern.  
Moreover, the residence and work permits may overestimate the number of EU-10 
nationals in the EU-15 since this data does not take account of the number of people 
who returned to their home countries and the length of the work permits. As the 
Commission states, an important percentage of the residence and work permits issued 
for the EU-10 nationals are for short-term or for seasonal jobs: 87% of the work permits 
in Austria were issued for less than six months; 95% of those in Germany are also valid 
for short term periods (European Parliament, 2006). Therefore, from this point of view, 
the existing data may show a greater amount of labour mobility after the enlargement 
than the actual number.  
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Table 2.1: Resident Working Age Population by Nationality 2005-row 
percentages 
 
Nationality Country of 
destination National EU-15 EU-10 non-EU 
Belgium 91.3 5.8 0.2 2.8 
Denmark 96.4 1.1 - 2.4 
Germany 89.5 2.8 0.7 7.0 
Greece 94.0 0.3 0.4 5.3 
Spain 90.5 1.2 0.2 8.1 
France 94.4 1.9 0.1 3.6 
Ireland 92.3 3.0 2.0 2.8 
Luxembourg 57.9 37.6 0.3 4.2 
Netherlands 95.7 1.4 0.1 2.8 
Austria 89.2 1.9 1.4 7.5 
Portugal 97.0 0.4  2.6 
Finland 98.3 0.4 0.3 1.0 
Sweden 94.8 2.3 0.2 2.7 
United Kingdom 93.8 1.7 0.4 4.1 
EU-15 92.4 2.1 0.4 5.1 
EU-10 98.4 0.2 0.2 1.2 
EU-25 93.7 1.7 0.3 4.3 
 
Source: European Commission Report on the Functioning of the Transitional 
Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006), 
2006 
 
 The Commission’s report also states that the mobility from the member states 
has positively impacted the labour market since the nationals of the EU-10 contribute to 
labour market performance, sustained economic growth and the state of public finances 
in each member state (Commission of the European Communities, 2006:11). 
Furthermore, the impact of the immigration relates to the skill composition and sectoral 
distribution of the workers with regard to their role in the labour market such as the 
complementary or supplementary role. The workers of the new members can be seen as 
a threat if they replace the already existing national workers and compete with them for 
similar jobs. However, if the workers of the new members complement the national 
workers and fill the gaps for the sectors where new workers are needed, the labour 
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markets of the member states would receive a positive contribution. In this sense, the 
report states that the division of the workers according to the sectors do not show a 
noteworthy change for the 2003-2005 period (ibid, 12). While the EU-15 nationals 
mostly work in the service sector, nationals of the new members are represented in 
construction.   
2.2.2.2. An example: UK and free movement of persons 
The United Kingdom, together with Sweden and Ireland, is one of the states that opened 
its borders to the new workers in the first period of the transitional arrangements and 
continued to do so in the second period. Despite the free movement regime that has 
been applied since the beginning of the accession, the UK government introduced a new 
“Workers Registration Scheme” which necessitates worker registration with the Home 
Office for certificate (Byrska, 2004).  
The Home Secretary of the UK, David Blunkett, regards the worker registration 
regime as a success since after the enlargement and the movement of workers of the 
new members to the UK, workers are regularising their status in the legal economy, 
taking jobs in the industries where needed and contributeing to the productivity of the 
UK economy (Home Office, 2004a). In the first phase of the transitional arrangements, 
the Home Office (2004b) stated that the UK government supported legal migration 
since it believed that new legal migrants could contribute to the development of the 
economy by increasing the production and the UK would benefit from the skills of the 
new migrants. Moreover, the Home Office also confirmed that if the contrary occurred, 
the government was allowed to apply the necessary measures to restrict the free 
movement (ibid). The Home Office also reported that between May and September, 
fewer than 91,000 nationals of the eight countries have registered for work and 45% of 
this population were already there before the 1 May (Home Office, 2004a). They have 
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been in the UK legally as visitors or non-working students, legal workers who have 
work permits or are self-employed but registered for a different job after the accession 
or as illegal workers (Gilpin, et al, 2006).  
 
 
Table 2.2 Stock of 8 Central and Eastern European Member Migrants in the UK 
aged 16 and over 
 
 Stock of new 
member migrants 
aged 16+ 
New member 
migrants as a 
percentage of the 
migrant population 
aged 16+ 
New member 
migrants as a 
percentage of the 
total population 
aged 16+ 
Summer 2005 245,000 5.6 0.53 
Summer 2004 165,000 4.0 0.36 
Summer 2003 110,000 2.8 0.24 
 
Source: Gilpin, N., et al. UK Department for Work and Pensions, 2006 
 
Therefore, the number of immigrants presented does not reflect the actual number 
of workers migrating after the accession because the Worker Registration Scheme 
requires foreign workers to register for each new job. As a result, changing jobs require 
reregistration; migrants are not obliged to deregister when they leave their jobs and 
country, and if “a EU8 worker has been legally employed for a period of 12 months” the 
worker does not have to register with the scheme (Heinen and Pegels, 2006:4) 
As the statistics of the Home Office show, many workers registered for August 
and September period and many of these workers particularly those worked in the 
agricultural sector, have returned to their home countries. With the abolishment of the 
restrictions on the free movement of workers, illegal migrants in the UK have 
legitimized their status and helped the UK government tackle to some extent with the 
underground economy. Blunkett (2004) says “Our common sense approach to EU 
enlargement has put us at a clear advantage compared to the rest of Europe. Illegal 
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workers have legitimised their status and are contributing to the economy, benefiting 
from protection in the workplace and allowing us to focus resources on other forms of 
illegal working.” (ibid.). As Blunkett argues, while the UK has much more easier dealt 
with the abuse and illegal working, some of the old member states that could not apply 
the free movement, experienced greater problems tackling with illegal work (Home 
Office, 2004a). He also states: 
    The success of the worker registration scheme and the information it gives 
us - on the sectors accession nationals are working in and the jobs they are 
doing - is an important part of the ongoing review of our managed migration 
system. Through this we are delivering a tightly controlled migration 
programme, which is flexible enough to meet the needs of the UKlabour 
market and contribute to our economic growth, while tackling abuse and 
illegal working. This benefits everyone – legitimate employers, legal 
migrant employees and taxpaying UK workers (ibid.). 
 
According to the Home Office, for the period of May and September, migrant workers 
contributed 120 million euro to GDP of the UK with the 20 million euro tax and 
national insurance payment (ibid). The Home Office Minister Des Browne stressed 
similar outcomes, arguing that the UK benefited from the workers, considering the skill-
shortages in some of the sectors such as the agriculture, catering, and hospitality 
(Travis, 2004). He also points out that there would not be a flood of immigrants to the 
UK, but the high numbers assumed were just media exaggeration (ibid).  
Moreover, the European Parliament similarly comments on the impacts of the 
immigrants in the UK on the labour market in its report on the transitional arrangements 
restricting the free movement of worker on EU labour market. The Parliament 
(European Parliament, 2006:8) states:  
   Regarding the United Kingdom, after the labour market was opened up, 
60 000 job-seekers arrived from the new Member States in 2004; the two 
sectors chiefly concerned were agriculture and fisheries. Given the high 
number of vacancies, the influx certainly did not increase unemployment in 
those two sectors. On the contrary, the immediate effect it had was of 
improving the profitability and competitiveness of the businesses concerned, 
raising their productivity, and strengthening their financial position. In 
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macroeconomic terms, the policy of opening up the labour market translates 
into a marked increase in the British growth rate. 
 
 
Graph 2.1 Vacancies in the UK filled by the Central and Eastern member state 
nationals  
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Source: A Manpower Report, EU Enlargement-two years on, 2006 
 
A report carried out by NOP, a research company and Manpower, one of the 
largest companies in employment services in the UK, examined the impact of the EU 
enlargement on the UK labour market from the date of the accession of 10 new member 
states through a research on UK businesses. The report pointed out that although the 
number of migrant workers from the new member states increased in two years 
following the enlargement, their numbers are still low (A Manpower Report, 2006:2). 
Moreover, immigration has helped some sectors of the UK business to meet their needs. 
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Accession workers generally work in jobs requiring few skills and in bigger companies 
rather than smaller and medium-sized enterprises (ibid, 5).  
Despite opening of the borders for the new comers and providing jobs for them, 
the Government is strict on access to benefits. Before opening borders, the UK 
toughened controls on benefit access and informed the accession nationals on the 
limitations of government assistance.  
2.3 Conclusion 
The fears of a massive migration of the Central and Eastern European workers to the 
EU-15 resulted in the application of the transitional arrangements on the free movement 
of persons. The member states have been hesitant to the numbers of the potential 
immigrants and the negative impacts that they might cause on the labour markets. For 
the opponents of free movement, the immigration leads to pressure on the markets, 
causes further unemployment and replacement of the national workers, decreases 
wages, leads to attainment of the social benefits in the member states, and creates 
tensions in the society. The doubts of the member states reflect the material costs both 
for the member states and the public considering the possible pressure of the immigrants 
on the labour markets and the unemployment problem that many of the members 
experience. The proponents of immigration proposed the material benefits that member 
states could have with the movement of persons such as the filling of skill shortages by 
the immigrant workers where there is a need because of the aging population of Europe 
or the unwillingness of the native workers to do the job, and increase in the productivity 
with a reference to the experience of the member states that opened their borders for the 
new members. 
In the case of Turkey’s accession similar statements are put forward by the 
member states. Free movement of Turkish workers is discussed with respect to the costs 
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and benefits of immigration for the member states. However, Turkish example includes 
another perspective which drives the member states to think accession and immigration 
not only by considering the costs and benefits analysis but also from the identity 
perspective. If and when Turkey becomes an EU member, it will probably be the second 
largest country within the Union in terms of the size of its population. One could add 
that this large population is of a different culture and religion. The doubts and fears of 
the Europeans that arose in the previous enlargements, the arrangements to balance the 
immigration are also the main points of the discussion on Turkey’s accession. The 
Commission anticipated a condition to prevent the Turks from moving freely in the 
other EU countries. In the EU Negotiating Framework for Turkey (2005) it is stated 
that: 
      Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or 
permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available 
as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will 
include these, as appropriate, in its proposals in areas such as freedom of 
movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture. Furthermore, the 
decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of 
movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual 
Member States. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be reviewed 
regarding their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal 
market.  
  
As stated in the Negotiating Framework, the Commission is considering 
transitional arrangements in order to restrict the free movement of Turkish labour for a 
specific time period in order to prevent serious disturbances in the EU labour markets. 
Some of the member states are more eager than the others to put transitional restrictions 
on the free movement of Turkish labour in case of its accession. Since free movement is 
one of the fundamental principles of the EU and cannot be denied to any of the member 
states, permanent safeguards to check the free movement of Turkish workers and the 
transitional periods to gradually let the free movement within the EU help member 
states to think more positively about Turkey’s accession. Gunther Verheugen, EU 
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Enlargement Commissioner from 1999 to 2004, regarded this provision as necessary in 
order to alleviate the European fears about the free movement of Turks within the EU 
(Pope, Biefsky, Champion, 2004). Before the negotiations, France and Germany lobbied 
for the provision in the negotiating framework.  
The European Commission, based on the experience of the states who abolished 
the restrictions on the free movement of persons and the data about the number of 
immigrants in an enlarged Union after the accession, states that mobility from new 
members to the EU-10 has been more limited than it was assumed before the accession 
and has not greatly disturb the EU-15 labour markets, but the impact has been positive. 
Migration has led to the creation of new jobs and business especially by highly skilled 
workers, decreased labour shortages, increased competitiveness and production, 
formalized the underground economy, and improved social cohesion. Moreover, 
migration has contributed to the long-term growth of the economy and the increase in 
the public finances.   
In this context, the European Commission encourages member states to abolish 
restrictions and apply Community measures on the free movement. Moreover, the 
European Commission declared 2006 as the “European Year of Workers’ Mobility” 
with an aim to raise the awareness of the benefits of the movement of persons to work 
in an enlarged Union. Romania and Bulgaria will be EU members in January 2007. Free 
movement has also been discussed in the case of accession of these states. The same 
transitional arrangement framework with “2 plus 3 plus 2” scheme will be applied and 
member states will be allowed to restrict the free movement of Bulgarian and Romanian 
citizens until 2014. As a result, considering the doubts of the member states about 
Turkey’s accession and its population, it is highly certain that EU member states will 
restrict or limit the movement of Turkish immigrants in the EU and apply transitional 
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arrangements, derogations for Turkey in the case of its accession as seen in the previous 
enlargements and described in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EU MEMBER STATES’ PREFERENCES 
TOWARDS TURKISH IMMIGRATION 
 
This chapter addresses the European Union member states’ preferences towards Turkey 
around one major issue area: immigration. The relative support that member states show 
towards Turkey revolves around the possibility of migration from Turkey. There are 
two main issues: firstly, member states’ preferences that have a major role in the 
bargaining and decision making process and that are shaped by immigration related 
concerns; secondly, the opinion of the public that shapes or formulates the domestic 
politics within the states. The public opinion and member state preferences are not 
mutually exclusive. Public get its clue from the European leaders. Therefore, since the 
aim of the thesis is to look at to what extent immigration issue can be an obstacle to 
Turkey’s accession and to the application of the free movement principle for the 
Turkish labour, it is important to study on the preferences of the European leaders about 
the free movement of Turks in case of the accession of Turkey. 
In order to present the rationale behind the support and opposition to the 
movement of persons within the Union it is necessary to draw a theoretical framework. 
This chapter first tries to prepare a theoretical base for the whole discussion related to 
the reaction of the Europeans to the free movement of Turkish workers in Europe, and 
deals with the ideas of the member states with accentuation on the opinions of the 
member state leaders. The chapter does not aim to explain the real forecasts about the 
costs and benefits of free movement of Turkish labour, but aims to examine the member 
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state preferences with regard to the free movement of Turkish labour. The preferences 
of the member states are examined with cases of some of the member states such as 
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Austria and Netherlands who have large Turkish 
populations. These are five case studies illustrating the member state positions. The first 
three are chosen because they are the largest states in the European decision making 
process according to the liberal intergovernmentalism and show different attitudes to the 
free movement issue. The latter two are the states where the immigration is an important 
concern and a sensitive issue for the many. Moreover, the inclination of these member 
states towards the free movement of labour is important because states such as Austria 
and Germany opposed opening of the markets at least until the end of the second phase 
of the transitional arrangements in the Eastern enlargement. Moreover, the public of 
Netherlands and France opposed the EU Constitution and one could argue that the 
rejection of the Constitution Treaty is linked to the opposition to Turkey’s accession as 
well as the fears of immigration. 
Member states have different preferences and positions on the immigration issue. 
Their concerns for the immigration in the previous enlargements are applicable to the 
immigration issue with Turkey, but they also have some other concerns from cultural 
and security perspective. In order to understand the basis of these concerns, the 
theoretical framework will be described before dealing on the positions of the member 
states. 
3.1 Theoretical Discussion 
Andrew Moravcsik, the founder of the liberal intergovernmentalist theory, argues that 
European integration is the result of the bargains between the member states who act 
according to the national interests and it is the product of the rational choices made by 
the national leaders who pursue economic interests (Moravcsik, 1993). Liberal 
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intergovernmentalism is built upon three constituents: ‘the assumption of rational state 
behaviour’, ‘liberal theory of national preference formation’ and an 
‘intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation’ (Moravcsik, 1993:480). 
Deepening and broadening in European integration are initially promoted by the 
national governments, specifically by the heads of the governments, heads of states and 
powerful ministers (Puchala, 1999). Therefore, according to Moravcsik integration is 
possible if only it is in the interest of member states in terms of the material benefits that 
they preserve and each member state bargains during the decision making process 
according to the perceived costs and benefits and looks from the utility perspective. 
Therefore, European integration is the result of the relative power of some of the 
member states and the converging interests of these members; however these interests 
are shaped by the domestic factors such as the powerful societal groups which also 
preserve their benefits and empower or constrain the government in international 
negotiations.   
However, sociological institutionalism emphasizes the collective identity as the 
determining factor of policy preferences of the member states with regard to the 
enlargement process rather than the material costs and benefits of the member states 
(Muftuler-Bac, MacLaren, 2003). According to this theory, liberal values, and norms of 
the Community make the decision makers decide for the future enlargement and it is the 
expansion of the liberal Community that motivates the leaders. 
Schimmelfennig (2001:49) argues that “enlargement preference of the EU 
member states and the initial bargaining process largely conform to rationalist 
expectations, the international outcome… cannot be explained as the result of egoistic 
cost-benefit calculations and patterns of state preferences and power.”. While the 
rationalist approach does not take account of the common values and norms in the 
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absence of the material benefits, namely economic and security benefits, sociological 
approach regards these as necessary and sufficient for the expansion of an organization 
(ibid, 61). He believes that rationalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, can explain the 
preferences of the member states and the bargaining process in some important 
decisions, but it is unable to explicate the collective decision for the enlargement (ibid, 
76). However, the decision makers generally use a rhetoric which is based on the 
community, identity, collective norms, and values to justify their self-interests and 
Schimmelfennig named this strategic use of a norm-based expression as a ‘rhetorical 
action’.  Shared norms, values and beliefs with the new members provide the conditions 
for decision makers to rationalize what they intend to do. 
Nonetheless, Helene Sjursen (2002: 508) believes that the enlargement decision is 
derived by a sense of kinship-based duty which highlights the common cultural identity 
and it is this duty that mobilizes the member states to treat the Eastern Europe as 
preferential when compared with the accession of Turkey. Liberal democratic norms of 
the Community are not sufficient to explain the enlargement decisions. Therefore the 
accession does not depend on the norm-based justifications such as the norms of the 
liberal democracy and the criteria related to democracy and human rights or the utility 
calculations of the Community in terms of economy and security but depends on the 
sense of a Community (ibid, 491). As a result ethical-political reasons become 
important in the decision to enlargement. As seen in the Turkey’s case, the debates 
about Turkey’s accession have a different rhetoric than that of the Eastern Europe. 
Emphasize on collective identity was clearly seen in the accession of the CEECs. 
Integration of these countries was portrayed as a return to Europe, where they actually 
belong to, with a stress on the European history as a unifying factor of the Community 
(Kubicek, 2004). While new members claim that they have always been a part of the 
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European tradition with an adherence to the constitutive values and norms of the 
European Community, to some extent the old members regarded identity issue as a 
positive incentive for accession of these new members since they believed that they 
share common norms and a history. Although unifying Europe has become the main 
expression of the eastern enlargement, the opponents of Turkey’s accession generally 
link the accession with utility based considerations in terms of both economy and 
security and admitting Turkey would not unify Europe, but make Turkey a close partner 
to Europe (ibid, 504).   
Turkey’s accession does not include the value-based justifications. Kubicek 
(2005:73) states that “Although Turkey does not fit into the “return to Europe” 
narrative; its inclusion into Europe is increasingly being viewed as a responsibility and a 
political necessity if the EU hopes to aspire to be true to its highest ideals.”  It is a 
widespread view that Turkey is not a part of Europe in terms of its culture and history 
considering that Turks were generally defined as the other of Europe during the history. 
The cultural arguments that are proposed to oppose Turkey’s accession generally focus 
on the identity of Turkey with its different history, religion, traditions, and a different 
way of life. Former French president Valerie Giscard d’Estaing stated that Turkey was 
close to Europe, but its capital was not in Europe and 95% of its population live outside 
the Europe; Turkey has a different culture and way of life and it is not a European 
country, therefore Turkish entry into the EU would mean the end of Europe (Güney, 
2004).  
In this context, Turkey’s accession will mean the movement of Turks to Europe 
who do not have a European identity but have different life-styles. Therefore, free 
movement of Turks is regarded as a cultural challenge to the existing European values 
and norms and that’s why the immigration issue poses a significant obstacle to the 
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accession of Turkey. Cultural differences between Turkey and the EU make the 
Europeans fear that after the accession these culturally different people, as called by 
many Europeans, will reside within them as a different and segregated society or will 
get involved into the daily life of the European people by devastating the norms of the 
European culture. 
3.2.Member States’ Positions on the Immigration of Turkish Labour 
One aspect of Turkey’s accession which leads to many debates in terms of its costs and 
benefits for the member states is the issue of the free movement of persons. It is 
discussed from many perspectives such as the utility considerations which include both 
the economic and security considerations on the one hand and on the other hand it is a 
debated issue which leads to hesitancy of the member states from the cultural 
perspective.    
Free movement of Turkish labour becomes a problematic issue with respect to the 
opposition of the European public, the calculations of the economists, and the 
preferences of the member states considering both the demands of the labour markets, 
the public opinion on the issue and opposition of many European leaders. Therefore, the 
general concerns for the anti-immigrant sentiments have three important causes: first the 
socioeconomic costs which are the concerns about its negative impact on the job market 
such as the competition for jobs, structural unemployment, replacement of national 
workers, decrease in wages, and increase in the welfare burden; second, cultural 
concerns in terms of the failure of the integration of the immigrants to the society 
because of the different identities and different way of lives and cultural characteristics 
such as being non-European or non-Christian; third, the immigration issue, considering 
the opening of the borders to the Muslim workers, becomes sensational in terms of the 
security concerns. Therefore, with reference to the rise of Islamic presence in Europe, 
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the violent actions in the European cities and the threat of terrorism make the Islamic 
identity of Turkey more apparent in the discussions on its accession. The Security 
Strategy Document of the European Council of December 2003 states that one of the 
major threats that Europe faces today is linked with the violent religious extremism 
which causes crises in the society and alienation of the young generation (European 
Security Strategy, 2003:7). As a result, Turkish immigrants mean for the some, the rise 
of insecurity in the society because of the feasible violence that one can link with the 
non-European and Muslim identity of Turkey.  
Therefore, the case studies of five EU member states Germany, Austria, 
Netherlands, present to what extent the European states think Turkish immigration as a 
major concern for the European well-being and therefore an obstacle for the 
membership. 
3.2.1. Germany 
 
Immigration has been a hot political topic in Germany where the leaders had diverging 
views on the policies to be implemented. The new Immigration Act of Germany which 
was introduced on 1 January 2005 had been debated by the political parties and media 
from autumn 2001 to spring 2004. The new Act replaced the previous Green Card 
Scheme which aimed to make the movement of foreign IT specialists to Germany 
easier, since it failed to bring expected number of workers. With the new Immigration 
Act, Schroder’s government has taken an important step to change the attitude of 
German government to the immigration issue despite the criticism of the right parties. 
The migration act focuses on the measures to let the migration of highly-skilled 
foreigners for economic growth; it extends the scope of the rights of highly-skilled 
persons, their families, and students. Moreover, the law makes easier to expel the 
foreigner who is supposed to impose a threat for the security and it tries to recover the 
 37
failure of the previous integrationist measures by reforming them. The problems of the 
immigrants are addressed and in the act integration courses, German lessons for the 
migrants and improvement of the German of children whose first language is not 
German are focused for their integration to prevent the creation of ‘parallel societies’ in 
Germany. However, the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Christian Social Union 
(CSU) criticized the Immigration Law and the liberalization of movement of high-
skilled migrants. Merkel called for more integration of the existing immigrants in 
Europe before accepting new immigrants. The CDU and CSU argued that the labour 
migration should be limited and already existing migrants should be integrated before 
accepting more immigrants and they emphasized the domestic measures to train the 
people for skill shortages before filling them with new immigrants. The arguments of 
the Chancellor and her party make it clear that the new German government aims to 
develop the integration of the immigrants in Germany and to decrease the mismatch of 
the German workers which leads to unemployment although there are skill shortages in 
the labour market. Therefore, acceptance of more people to Germany seems to be 
problematic.   
As it has been in the debates on the new law on immigration, the German leaders 
also do not share the common ideas about the accession of Turkey and Turkish 
immigrants. The Chancellor of Germany Angelina Merkel and her centre-right Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) fear of an influx of Turkish immigrants to the European 
Union in case of Turkey’s accession (Browne, 2005). The Christian Democrats of 
Germany along with Merkel argue that Turkey is culturally different from Europe with 
a predominantly Muslim population and it has a diverging historical perspective. For 
this reason, especially during the election process in Germany they have argued that 
Turkey should be given privileged partnership. Moreover, Merkel argued that 
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multiculturalism failed in Germany and Turkey’s accession would make the situation 
worse and also she stated that “A Europe with Turkey as a full-fledged member won’t 
be a Europe that is fully integrated…The degree of European integration achieved over 
50 years must not be thrown away just like that” (Bowley, 2004a). There have been 
other leaders in Europe who supported this argument of Merkel such as the Former 
French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, leader of the French Union for Popular 
Movement (UMP) Nicolas Sarkozy and Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel (Kart, 
2005). Merkel’s opposition to the membership and her emphasize on the unemployment 
problem in Germany take the support of the Germans who fear of the large influx of 
Turkish immigrants. The CDU focused on the integration problems of the Turks in 
Germany and failure of multicultural society. Therefore, for many German leaders, the 
immigration of Turks will not solve Germany’s problems but further socio cultural gap 
within the society. 
However, the former Chancellor Schroeder from the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) thinks that Turkey’s accession will improve the security of Europe and he said 
that “If we manage to bind Turkey so closely to the West that it can't get away anymore, 
and through this we manage to combine a non-fundamental Islam with the values of the 
Western enlightenment in Turkey, then we in Germany and in Europe will gain 
security," (Baker, 2005). Schroder says that “Negotiations about the accession of this 
country [Turkey] will last 10 years and 15 years.” and he states: 
   The negotiating concept will allow that we eliminate migration to our job 
market. It will allow for both sides to interrupt or call off the talks. Thus it is 
an appropriate instrument for reaching our goal without putting any EU 
country, including Germany, in too difficult a position (Deutsche Welle, 
2005).  
 
Therefore he emphasized the fact that member states can delay the movement of 
migrants into their countries until a specific time. However considering the immigration 
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trend from Turkey to Germany, he states that before admitting Turkey, Brussels should 
develop a common EU immigration and asylum policy regulating the settlement of 
foreigners since Germany can only take certain number of immigrants (Schmid, 1998). 
Besides the stance of the German government that opposes further immigration 
and its will to decrease the labour shortages by educating as well as training the native 
people, there is another aspect of immigration which has an impact on the attitudes of 
the European leaders towards the free movement of Turkish people and that is the 
existing immigrant population in Germany. Germany has the largest Turkish population 
in Europe and it has not only traditionally been an accepting state for the Eastern 
European country workers because of its proximity but also has been a destination 
country for the Turkish immigrants since 1950s (see Table 3.1). However, during the 
first years of immigration of Turks, Turkish migrants were given limited rights since 
they were thought to be guest workers who would return to the home country and 
Germany was not thought to be an immigration country by the German leaders. 
 
Table 3.1. The Turkish Population in the EU Member States (in thousands) 
 Total Turkish Nationality Naturalized 
Germany 2,642 1,912 730
France 370 196 174
Netherlands 270 96 174
Austria 200 120 80
Belgium 110 67 43
UK 70 37 33
Denmark 53 39 14
Source: Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, Europe More than a 
Promise?, 2004 
 
 
There are 7.3 million foreigners in Germany, more than 3 million of them are 
Muslims and 2.6 million are Turks or Germans with Turkish origins. The discussion on 
Turkey’s accession is generally tied with the minorities in Germany and with the failure 
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of integration of the migrants, with emphasize on the Turkish minority. Austin and 
Parker (2005) argue that most part of the opposition to accession of Turkey relates to 
the failed integration of the Turkish minority into the German society. The problems of 
the immigrant societies vary from poverty, unemployment levels above the average, to 
the ghettoisation and the increase in criminality (ibid.15). Many Turks are economically 
disadvantaged and have higher unemployment levels especially among the younger 
generations. Turkish students are worse than the German nationals at school because of 
the problems in the language. They show lower levels of political participation. 
However this is regarded as a breakdown of German foreigners’ law by the minority 
associations in Germany. Especially banning the double citizenship, which was 
tolerated before 2000 and provided the migrants to have the citizenship of both the 
home and the host country, had negative impacts on the Turkish minority since having 
only Turkish citizenship make the full political participation difficult considering that 
Turkey is not an EU member (Ozdemir, 2005). According to the German laws, German 
nationality is only granted when the applicants renounce their current nationality and if 
they take the German citizenship by birth, they make a choice at the age of 18 (Davy, 
2005). Thus, the result is the non-integration of the Turkish society and creation of 
segregated societies. 
For most of the Germans and the German leaders who emphasize the cultural 
differences of the Turkish people, Turks represent the culturally ‘other’ who do not 
preserve human rights especially of women and who have domestic violence, honour 
killings and as a result do not show commitment to the German values. This furthers the 
negative connotation of the Turkish immigrants for the Germans and becomes the basis 
of the negative rhetoric of the German leaders. Therefore, since Germany has not yet 
solved its integration problem, Turkey’s EU membership that would lead to the 
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migration of more Turks to Europe creates tensions in the party politics. In Germany the 
political party debates about Turkey’s accession and opposition to immigration 
generally reflect the concerns about the failure of the policies for the integration of the 
Turkish immigrants and the negative impact of the Turkish immigrants on the social 
cohesion of the country. The unemployment figure in Germany forms an important part 
of the opposition to the Turkish immigrants. With Austria, Germany decided to keep the 
restrictions on the free movement of Eastern European member states at least until the 
end of the transitional arrangements till 2009. The main reason of Germany to close its 
labour market to the Eastern European workers is stated by the government as the high 
unemployment rates.  
Therefore, German opposition to the immigration relates to the concerns about the 
cultural differences because of the fact that Turkish immigrants may not be able to 
absorb the values and norms of the German society and the economic problems where 
there is high unemployment rate and unemployment is more serious among the young 
immigrants. 
3.2.2. Austria 
 Austrian government has a critical stance against Turkey’s membership. Austria 
blocked the starting of membership negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 and it 
was the only member state who has been holding the ‘No’ card. After two days, 
Austrian government pulled back and agreed with the 24 EU partners to open the 
membership talks with Turkey. However, new Austrian government of Social 
Democratic Party and Conservative People’s Party announced that Austria will consult 
the public in a referendum for the accession of Turkey (Euroactiv, 2007).  
 The Austrian general election campaigns focused on two main issues: the 
immigration issue and the decline of the welfare states. During the campaigns, the 
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statements and the posters of the political parties reflected the attitudes of the leaders 
towards these issues and their demand to mobilize the public around the most sensitive 
issues in Austria to get the popular support. The slogans of the right wing parties stating 
that ‘Oust 300,000 Immigrants’, and ‘Safe-Pensions, not Asylum Rights’ showed the 
discontent of the parties with regard to the immigration (Euroactive, 2006a). The 
rhetoric of the far-right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) also emphasizes the opposition 
to Turks by the election posters stating ‘Daham statt Islam’ namely ‘Home instead of 
Islam’ and “Austria and not TurkEU” (Bowley, 2006). The party states that it agrees on 
the idea that 45% of the Muslims do not want to integrate (European Stability Initiative, 
2006a). The party sees the accession of Turkey as risky and it warns of an immigration 
wave from Turkey which would endanger the Austrian culture (Apfl and Huter, 2006). 
Moreover, the leading candidate for Alliance for Austria’s Future Party pronounced that 
he wanted to expel 300,000 foreigners out of the country by car, train or bus (Euroactiv, 
2006a). It was only the Greens who campaigned for the immigrants’ rights.  The right 
wing parties, FPÖ and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), who increased their 
voices against Turkey’s membership and immigration, also increased their votes in the 
general elections.  
 Hence Turkey’s accession becomes problematic when thinking of the anti-
immigrant sentiments both at the public and the elite level. Austria has a roughly 
300,000 Muslim population and the majority of them are of Turkish origin. Austria has 
the third largest Turkish minority in Europe at more than 150,000. Since Muslims are 
regarded as a society who do not show respect to human rights, discriminate women and 
do not integrate to the European societies, the immigration of more Muslims, referring 
to Turks becomes a problematic issue. The history has also a role in defining the Turks 
for the Austrians by remembering the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and in 1683 as 
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the Muslim threat. The Turks historically represent the culturally other of Europe and a 
threat to the European civilization with the oppressive, violent, savage character 
(Muftuler Bac, 2000:27). Moreover, the debates on the welfare structure of the country 
and the social security which are visible in the populism of the right, dominated the 
election discussions. The anti-immigrant and anti-Turkey attitudes in the party politics 
have to do with the history of the Austrians with the Turks. Since the historical hatred 
combines with the modern day problems such as the concerns about unemployment, the 
issue becomes more complicated. The critical stance on the immigrants arises from the 
contemplation that the immigrants take jobs, benefit from the social security schemes, 
they cannot integrate to the society and show criminal attitudes.  
The former Prime Minister Wolfgang Schüssel takes attention to the Negotiating 
Framework for Turkey which states that “The shared objective of the negotiations is 
accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot 
be guaranteed beforehand.” (Negotiating Framework for Turkey, 2005:1) and he states 
that the outcome of the negotiations may be different than the full-membership (Turkish 
Press, 2006). Moreover, Shussel worries about the costs of Turkey’s membership by 
saying that “Turkey's EU accession would cost as much as the recent accession of all 
ten new members. Before saying there is full membership for Turkey, someone has to 
explain to me how to finance that. We have to keep the absorption capacity of the EU in 
mind. This is what we owe to the anxieties and worries of our citizens." (European 
Stability Initiative, 2005). The new Chancellor of Austria Alfred Gusenbauer argues 
that “Turkey in the EU would mean the end of the EU, if that does not happen before 
anyway. What I understand as integration might not even be possible with 25 member 
states anymore. The speed of enlargement has been too high." (ibid.). Moreover in the 
government program of Austria (2007:7) it is stated that the commitment of Turkey and 
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its population to the European values and standards is in the interests of all member 
states of the EU. 
Austria together with France was opposing Turkey’s membership with a fear that 
Turks may flow to Europe and may further the immigration related problems there 
(Kirisci, 2004). Prime Minister Schussel declared that “There are protection 
mechanisms against Turkey. First of all, it is out question for us to open the Austrian 
labour market to Turkish workers.” and he insisted on the need to allay the popular fears 
against Turkish immigrant workers in case of the membership (Turkish Press, 2006). 
Schussel asserted that Austria would impose permanent safeguard to limit the flow of 
Turkish workers to protect its labour market (European Commission News Letter, 
2005). President Schussel asserts the doubts about the flood of Turkish immigrants 
including the cheap labour force to Austria who has already high level of 
unemployment of 6% and he emphasizes the burden of accession of Turkey on the 
member states considering that Turkey is a poor country with 70 million population and 
it will be the second largest country in the EU. Moreover, Foreign Minister Ursula 
Plassnik, by referring to Turkey’s membership, says that “There is the question if the 
EU can take this, if we are paying enough attention to our people” and argues that the 
government listens to its people who generally show low level of support favouring 
Turkey’s membership and even oppose the accession and free movement of Turkish 
labour to the Austrian job market (Anderson, 2005). Furthermore, by referring to the 
public opposition to the Turkey’s accession in Austria, the Chairman of the Social 
Democratic Party of Vienna and the Mayor and Governor of Vienna since 1994, argued 
that “People are not xenophobic, but they were worried. I take their worries seriously” 
(European Stability Initiative, 2005). 
 45
Austria is one of the two countries who decided to keep the restrictions to the 
Central and Eastern European workers at least until the end of the second period as well 
as to the Bulgarian and Romanian workers as well. Moreover, in Austria immigration of 
foreigners is reduced gradually in the recent years. Former Chancellor Schussel 
announced that the immigration and the family unification quotas should be reduced 
because of the unemployment rate which is more visible among the immigrants and told 
that it was necessary to impose stricter rules on the naturalisation of the immigrants, 
namely getting Austrian citizenship (Austrian Federal Chancellery News, 2005). 
Therefore, considering the strict control on immigration in Austria, the restrictions for 
the Turkish workers in case of the membership seems to be inevitable considering the 
high population of Turkey, the anti-immigrant sentiments in the country and specifically 
the hesitancy towards the Muslim immigrants.  
Therefore, although Austrian government agreed to open the accession talks with 
Turkey, there are still some opposition to Turkey’s full-membership because of the 
market related concerns such as the negative economic impact of the flood of Turkish 
labour which would mean the flood of cheap labour and cultural concerns. However, the 
economic costs of the enlargement are more pronounced in the statements of the 
government. The government generally refers to the public opposition in the country 
that oppose Turkey’s membership because of the probability of huge amount of 
immigrants since Austria fears of the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments towards the 
immigrant workers if and when free movement principle applies (Hardy, 2002). 
Therefore, labour migration is thought to bring economic and social problems. Turkish 
immigrants may compete for the jobs in the host country and replace the native 
workers; the increase in the supply of workers from Turkey may lead to unemployment 
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for the local workers and decrease the salaries by considering the negative long-term 
unemployment forecasts in Austria.  
3.2.3. Netherlands 
Immigration is one of the most politically sensitive issues in Netherlands considering 
that it has the second largest Muslim population in Europe after France. It is an 
immigration country where there is an experience of multicultural society. However the 
government has been criticized because of the failure of its integration policy and non-
integration of the Muslims. The assassination of the Dutch author Theo Van Gogh by a 
Dutch Moroccan man illustrated the failure of the immigration policy of Netherlands 
and the multiculturalism for the some. Reactions to the Muslim immigrants including 
the violent attacks to the mosques of the Muslim communities in the aftermath of the 
event triggered the problems in the society and demonstrated the rise of anti-immigrant 
sentiments, xenophobia, and even racism towards the immigrant societies. As a result 
while there is hesitancy against the Muslim minority in the country, the debate about the 
free movement of foreign nationals, and accession of Turkey with a predominantly 
Muslim population caused some doubts and this has been expressed by the decision 
makers in Netherlands. 
It is a prevalent view that successive governments in Netherlands tend to limit the 
immigration by increasing legal barriers. The Dutch finance minister Gerrit Zalm argues 
that “We need long transition periods, and must be able to decide for ourselves when 
there can be free movement of people” and furthers that each member states are to 
decide on the time to lift the restrictions (Bowley, 2004b). Although the Dutch 
government rejected the notion of privileged partnership instead of the full membership 
in a parliamentary debate on 11 April 2006, the criticisms against Turkey’s accession 
emerged within the governing party Dutch Christian Democrats (CDA), the party of 
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Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Foreign Minister Bernard Bot, because of the 
fact that Turkey is not a Christian country and they take the attention to the religious 
differences which may create problems (European Stability Initiative Series, 2006b:24). 
However, as opposed to the Christian Democrats in Germany, France and Austria, the 
party in Netherlands officially rejected the cultural and religious based oppositions but 
focused on the need for economic and political development of Turkey (ibid, 12).  
With regard to The Dutch Liberal Party (VVD), the Dutch State Secretary for 
Europe Atzo Nicolai argued that one of the most important concerns of the party was 
immigration and flood of Turkish workers to Holland (ibid,14). Party members 
supported the transitional arrangements to limit the free movement of persons and 
called for application of restrictions for the Turkish workers with the safeguard clause 
on freedom to move. However the concerns of the party members do not relate to the 
differences in religion and culture to a large extent but the population of the Turks and 
the economic impact of immigration. Moreover, the concerns of the VVD members 
about the immigration do not lead them to oppose Turkey’s accession since the party 
members voted in favour of the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. The 
labour party (PvdA) also supports Turkish membership, but the party set out some strict 
conditions and stated that “free movement of individuals is not automatic with the 
accession, but requires a separate and unanimous decision about the free movement and 
transition periods, including with a safeguard clause” (ibid, 16).  
There are opposite voices to the free movement of Turkish people in Netherlands 
as seen in the statements of the leaders and preferences of the political parties. The 
government is thinking to apply long-transitional period for the free movement of 
Turkish workers as the other EU members, however the reason of the opposition varies 
from economic consideration to the cultural and security related anxieties.  
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3.2.4. United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom was one of three member states who opened its borders to the new 
immigrants with the Eastern Enlargement. The UK allowed free movement of workers 
to fill skill shortages in its labour market and the result of the immigration of workers 
has been declared to be positive as discussed in the previous chapter. Despite the 
opposition voices in the government and criticism of the free movement with an 
argument that the Eastern European workers made a very limited contribution, but the 
social benefit costs outweighed the economic benefits and at the end they became 
burden on the government, the government insisted that immigration created positive 
results yet the migration had to be managed in order to benefit from it. This is why the 
UK allowed for free movement but limited the access to social benefits for the Eastern 
European workers and limited the number of workers of the Romania and Bulgaria. 
Although the UK has applied an open policy towards immigration from the beginning, 
the government decided not to do so for the Romanian and Bulgarian workers but apply 
stricter controls on immigration in order to manage it carefully because of the idea that 
immigration can bring benefits to a country if it is properly controlled (BBC News, 
2006). As a result the labour market of the UK is opened to a small group of skilled 
people, some seasonal agricultural workers and the self-employed (Wintour, 2006). 
In the case of Turkey, the UK has been supporting the accession for a very long 
time. The UK has always stated that supporting Turkish membership would have 
positive implications for the Muslim world since the accession means incorporating a 
modern Muslim country into the Western values and favouring democracy in Turkey. 
Therefore the government believes that the cultural divergence is a positive thing rather 
than a threat and integrating Turkey would enhance the social security within Europe. 
With regard to the free movement of Turkish workers, in the European Standing 
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Committee debates in 2004, Denis MacShane, Minister for Europe, declared that the 
British government supported Turkey’s accession if it met all the required criteria for 
membership and applied the acquis and the government is “generally in favour of the 
free movement of labour” (House of Commons, 2004).  
The Conservative Party of the UK proposed the limitation of the number of 
immigrants and the asylum seekers in the UK in the 2005 general election and Tony 
Blair’s government argued that the UK is in need of migrants who would contribute to 
economic growth of the country and instead he was firm on putting stricter control on 
the asylum seekers. In contrast to Germany, in the UK there is not a fear of parallel 
societies; and the cultural differences within the society and the religious identity are 
less pronounced (Austin, Parker, 2005:25). Therefore, Turkey’s accession is not linked 
to the fears of possible social problems that the Turkish migrants may cause (ibid, 27). 
As have been in the Eastern enlargement, the UK government decides to allow free 
movement according to skill shortages in its labour market.  
Talking from the intergovernmentalist perspective, the government shapes its 
policy on free movement according to the material benefits of the immigration. Since 
the UK tries to respond to the demands of the labour market, despite favouring Turkey’s 
accession and free movement in general, it is rational to suppose that the government 
will impose restrictions on the movement of Turkish people. Therefore, the government 
does not think that free movement of Turkish workers will be a problem from the 
cultural perspective, since it believes that integration of a Muslim population to the 
European Union will make the relations better with the other Muslim societies both 
inside and outside the Europe and it will mean an enrichment of the European culture 
and development of the social order from the security perspective. After the accession, 
hence, application of free movement principle for the Turkish workers will be 
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considered within the scope of the economic benefits of the UK which will be defined 
in terms of the demands of the labour market such as skill shortages for creating a 
dynamic and competitive market.  
3.2.5. France 
 
France has been a key player in the touchy issues of the Europe such as the enlargement 
and integration. France is an immigrant country by being home to nearly five million 
foreigners and as a result immigration is a sensitive issue considering the problems with 
the minorities especially with the Muslim immigrants. With regard to the accession of 
Turkey, immigration becomes an important concern for the French leaders. Turkey’s 
membership that would allow the free movement of Turkish labour finds its reflection 
in the other related issues such as the perceptions about the immigrant Turks in France, 
difficulty with the Muslims and assimilation problems in the society. The violent acts of 
the young Muslim generation such as the burning of cars and other criminal acts in the 
suburbs, followed by the riots in 2005, were seen as the alarming bell for the rise of 
radical Islam in Europe and even as a Muslim-intifada by many Europeans. These 
events illustrated the immigration problems of France and the failure of its social model. 
The French began to pay more attention to the problems of the disintegrated young 
generation which cause chaos in the society and put the internal security in danger. It 
also showed the results of the unemployment problem because of an underclass 
rebellion which is becoming structural in Europe considering that unemployment 
among immigrants is more than that of the native population.   
It is accurate that most of the French leaders did not make welcoming speeches 
for Turkey. Although President Chirac supports Turkey’s accession, other French 
leaders generally refer to the public unease while stating their opposition (Bowley, 
2004a). The former French President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing said that Turkey’s 
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accession will mean ‘the end of Europe’ since it ‘was not a European country’ (Güney, 
2004). Nicolas Sarkozy and Dominique de Villepin have spoken against Turkey’s 
accession (Grant, 2006:8). The leader of the French Union for Popular Movement 
(UMP) Nicolas Sarkozy is one of the European leaders who have supported Merkel’s 
third way which foresees a privileged partnership for Turkey. As opposed to its 
opponents, President Chirac has supported Turkey’s membership, but he also called for 
a French referendum on the entrance of Turkey to the European Union (Aybey and 
Ozturk, 2005). 
With regard to the statements of the leaders about Turkey’s membership, Austin 
and Parker (2005:24) argues that “strong opposition by French political leaders to 
Turkish entry is an easier way of tapping into what is mostly opposition to further 
enlargement or unease with immigration”. Therefore, the immigration issue shapes the 
views of the leaders in France or at least their rhetoric about Turkey and free movement 
and the ideas about Turkey revolve around the cultural related concerns because of their 
experience about the Muslim immigrants. The immigration issue in France is also 
coming to the front in the coming days of the 2007 presidential elections and the two 
candidates show different attitudes to the issue. Nicolas Sarkozy talks about the 
suspension of the membership talks with Turkey if he wins and making Turkey a close 
ally rather than a member. He also says “We now have to say who is European and who 
is not” considering that Turkey has imposed problems in the enlargement debate 
because of its Muslim population (Bennhold, 2006). While Sarkozy speaks out for the 
restriction of the number of the migrants according to the selective criteria of education, 
knowledge of French and professional experience, Ségoléne Royal criticises Sarkozy 
for his intention to restrict the family reunification but both agree on the regulating 
migration according to the needs of the French labour market (Euroactiv, 2006b)  
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France is one of the countries where the public opposes the accession of Turkey 
and further immigration and see integration of Turkey as a failure of the European 
project since the government supports membership. France opened its borders to the 8 
Eastern European countries after the first phase of the transitional period and to 
Romania and Bulgaria from the time of their accession with the support of most of the 
French trade unions who believe that the countries without restrictions have profited 
economically.   
3.3 Conclusion 
As seen in the statements and attitudes of the member state leaders towards the free 
movement of Turkish people, the ideas of the leaders change according to what they 
perceive as the cost or benefit at the end of immigration. Therefore from Moravscik’s 
perspective it is true that the decision makers generally seek for the material benefits 
and it has been so when the member states closed their markets by considering the 
labour market disturbances and unemployment figures in their countries in the Eastern 
enlargement. However, in Turkey’s case Sjursen’s ‘kinship based duty’ concept and a 
sense of community become visible in the debates about the security and cultural related 
concerns. 
Ayhan Kaya (2005) claims that the European leaders as Sarkozy, German 
Chancellor Merkel, Lafontaine and Rasmussen are inclined to use a rhetoric which is 
against the immigrants, Muslim society in Europe and Turkey’s accession because of 
the other concerns in the domestic politics. Nation states, who cannot respond to the 
structural problems within their countries, use the ‘fear policy’ in order to gain the 
legitimacy (ibid.). As a result, European leaders prefer to talk about the negative 
implications of the immigration and especially of the Muslim immigrant societies such 
as terrorism, violence, human and drug trafficking in order to mobilize the public 
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without dealing with the structural problems such as unemployment, poverty and 
inequality (ibid.).  
The main point of the concerns of the EU member states is the high population of 
Turkey with a lower GDP level and possible flood of these people to Europe after the 
accession. The member states that have problems with the immigrant population in their 
countries, the leaders, at least the far-right parties are more open to talk about the social 
threat that the immigrants may pose by underlining the cultural and religious based 
differences. This is what Schimmelfennig called as a rhetorical action, as the use of 
norm-based expression of the leaders to rationalize what they intend to do. It is also 
seen that the European governments refer to the opposition of the public when talking 
about the costs of the immigration. Therefore, as seen in the debates on Turkey’s 
accession, not all but an important part of the European leaders use a rhetoric that 
underlines the doubts of the influx of Turkish people regarding the high population of 
Turkey and relatively low GDP level and emphasizes the economic, cultural and 
security related concerns by mobilizing the public concerns in order to divert the 
attention from the other domestic issues. Therefore, it is sure that members tend to 
impose transitional arrangements for the gradual opening of borders for Turkish 
migrants because of the economic, security and cultural related concerns if Turkey 
becomes an EU member. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC AND ITS POSITION ON TURKISH 
IMMIGRATION 
 
The second aspect of Turkey’s potential impact on labour movements and immigration 
relates to the public. As the EU member state preferences and the public opinion are not 
mutually exclusive, having dealt with the preferences of the member states in the 
previous chapter, this chapter looks at the attitudes of the European public towards 
Turkey’s accession from the immigration perspective. In order to have a clue about the 
public opinion, the data of the Eurobarometer surveys on different issues such as the 
support for Turkey’s accession, necessary conditions for Turkey’s membership, main 
problems that member states face today, contributions of the immigrants to the society, 
are examined. The data provides general indications of what the public thinks but do not 
endow with why they think so. Therefore, the chapter analyses the reasons of the 
opposition or support of the European public for the immigration of Turkish labours 
which relate to various factors such as the domestic situation with regard to economic 
problems such as unemployment, past experiences with the immigrant societies and 
existing anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim sentiments among the public.  
4.1. Does Public Opinion Matter? 
The preferences of the European public play a crucial role in the formation of the 
attitudes of the member states towards the European issues and constitute a driving 
force for the European policy makers. European politics can be regarded as a two level 
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game played both at the lower level within each member state and at the EU level 
between the member states (Putnam, 1988: 434). At the international level, relative 
power of the member states and the bargaining process among them shape the final 
decision, but at the domestic level there is a process going on between the domestic 
groups who pursue their interests and apply pressure on the government in order to 
make them seek their demands in the international bargaining. At the national level, the 
actors may be ‘bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes’ and ‘public 
opinion’ (ibid, 436). Moravcsik (1999: 518) states: 
   Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is 
unable to achieve efficiently. Government policy is therefore constrained by 
the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups 
(inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central 
decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences.  
 
Therefore, national governments are constrained by the actors at home since they try to 
gain the support of the domestic actors and build coalitions among them and in return 
they seek the preferences of these domestic players while shaping their policies and they 
satisfy the domestic pressures (Putnam, 1988: 434). 
Furthermore, public opinion also matters for the national bureaucratic politics 
where the preferences of the public may be referred as a cause of the choice and the 
final decision of the national leaders in order to preclude public opposition. Even the 
views of the public are used as a legitimatizing tool for what the national leaders want 
to do at the European level with regard to the sensitive issues on the European agenda 
and also at the diplomatic level some of the decisions are determined by referring to the 
demands of the public (Carkoglu, 2003:171). As a result, it is difficult to take the public 
opinion separately from the government decisions since national governments are 
responsible for the decisions they take in the name of the public both in the domestic 
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and foreign politics of the government and they need the support of the public to stay in 
power.  
Although the early phase of integration is derived by the European elites, public 
support has been an important factor in the process. Moreover the development of 
European democracy within the institutional framework of the EU such as the European 
Parliament through which the European public has been included in the policy making 
with the election of the parliamentarians, has illustrated the increasing importance given 
to the ideas of the public. There have been criticisms about the democratic deficit of the 
EU and it is always stated by the Europeans that the support of the public is necessary to 
make the EU as a democratically legitimate entity. As a neo-functionalist, Inglehart 
points out that European integration cannot go further without the support of the public 
and both the deepening and widening of the Union requires the support of the mass 
publics (Anderson, Kalenthaler, 1996:179). National referenda that are carried out in the 
member states to take the opinion of the public on various key issues such as the 
European integration and constitutional documents reflect the importance given to the 
public opinion. Furthermore, there are opinion polls and surveys such as the 
Eurobarometer surveys which are commissioned to develop a dialogue between the 
European Union citizens and the decision makers by taking their ideas, learning their 
expectations and attitudes towards different issues such as the future of Europe, further 
enlargement, the European constitution, and personal satisfaction of the life in the EU. 
4.2. Explaining the Concerns of the Public on Immigration of the Turkish 
Labour 
The literature on the public opinion for understanding the anti-immigrant sentiments in 
Europe focuses on three important perspectives which also help to explain the hesitancy 
of the European public towards Turkish immigrants. These concerns are: 
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¾ rational concerns which are socio-economic based, such as the loss of 
jobs, disturbances in the labour market, decrease of wages, increase in 
the welfare  expenditure and social costs for the government and the 
public, 
¾ security concerns including the fears of criminality, loss of control over 
immigration, and resurgence of terrorist acts, 
¾ cultural concerns which focus on the cultural differences, different life-
styles, religious and ethnic difference which may cause integration 
problems (Boswell, Chou and Smith, 2005:12).  
As the attitudes of the European public towards Turkey’s membership and 
immigration vary in the member states, the reasons of the opposition and support also 
differ to a large extent. Not all the member states have the same attitude towards the 
immigration and immigrants and also do not have the similar experiences with the 
Turkish immigrant societies. Therefore, the feelings of the public may change according 
to the economic situation in their countries, such as the unemployment problem or need 
for foreign labour because of skill shortages. However their experiences with the 
immigrant societies, the perception of Turks and Muslims also have role in the 
formation of the European public opinion. When they perceive costs in terms of culture, 
economy or security they become more offensive to accept the immigrants, but the 
perceived potential benefits relieve the opposition to a large extent.  
McLaren’s work on the public support for the EU helps to draw conclusions on 
immigration issue from the cultural perspective. She argues that one of the most 
important points in the hesitancy towards the integration of other members is the 
perceived threat posed by the other cultures and antipathy towards other cultures 
besides the rational costs and benefit analysis (McLaren, 2002). She says that when the 
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public thinks about the policies, they mostly consider the needs of the society as a 
whole rather than the individual need and they act according to the group categorization 
and favour their own group but have hostile attitudes towards the people of other 
groups. The threat can be both a realist threat which leads to hesitancy of the public 
towards immigration with a concern about the general resources of the nation, and a 
symbolic threat that causes a concern about the culture and way of life of the society. 
Therefore the will of the public to protect the nation and the group identity against the 
threats form their attitudes towards the European integration and immigration in specific 
(ibid.555). As a result, cultural threat that the public perceive from the immigrant 
societies, becomes an important part of the opposition. In this context, in many member 
states, integration of the immigrants is generally linked to Islam. Anti-immigrant 
sentiments towards the Muslims have been more pronounced after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the USA, Madrid and London bombings. In this context, the idea of free 
movement of Turks is met with hesitancy from the security perspective, and the 
attitudes of the public are shaped around the debates on the existence of parallel 
societies in the member states and the hesitancy towards the Islam.  
Socio-cultural concerns also form a big part of the opposition since the public 
thinks that Turkish immigration will lead to the problems of integration because of the 
different cultural characteristics, social norms and religious identity of the Turks as they 
also refer to these reasons for the integration problems of the existing Turkish 
population in the member states. From the cultural perspective, the concerns have two 
dimensions: the first dimension is the negative influence of the other cultures on the 
culture of the receiving society such as lower respect to human rights and non-ethical 
behaviour at work etc. The other concern relates to the failure of the integration and 
segregation of the migrant population from the society in many occasions of life; for 
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instance with isolated housing or by using the native language rather than learning the 
language of the host country.  
Moreover, the discussions of the leaders about the inability of the immigrants to 
integrate to the society and the debates on the problems that they cause promote the 
negative views of the public towards immigrants and further immigration. As Vreese 
and Boomgaarden argue (2005:64), in recent years there is an increase in the popularity 
of the anti-immigrant political parties, pointing out the right-wing parties, and anti-
immigration sentiments among the society improve the support for these parties. 
However, they do not argue that these parties create hatred in the Europeans towards 
immigrants, they play an important role in the formation of the stance of the Europeans 
on the issue because of the negative emphasize on the immigration issue in the party 
politics (ibid.). As Zaller argues cited by McLaren (1999: 8), if all the political parties 
share the same view on a specific policy and they all support that policy, the politically 
aware individuals incorporate the views of these elites, however on the other hand if 
there is a divergence between the parties on the issue, therefore the partisan values of 
the individual helps him to shape his preferences according to the message he gets from 
different senders. However as McLaren says this is not possible on the immigration 
issue since there is a lack of consensus among the leaders (ibid. 9). For instance the 
party politics in Austria lead the public mobilize on xenophobic attitudes. The FPÖ 
developed an election campaign in spring 2005 local elections with a saying that 
“Vienna must not become Istanbul”, “Pummerin [bell of Saint Stephen church] instead 
of Muezzin” and they give the message that accession of Turkey will result in the mass 
flow of the Turks and they will jeopardize the security and damage the Austrian culture 
(Apfl, Huter, 2006). Largely because of this campaign, the party has earned 15% of the 
votes in the 2005 local elections in Vienna (ibid).  
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Boswell, Chou and Smith (2005:34) have also indicated another dimension for the 
hostility towards immigration which does not relate to migration at all but a reflection 
of the other sentiments that may occur with the social, political and economic change 
such as the unemployment, failure of the welfare systems and loss of social security. 
They argue: 
   Most non-rationalist theories locate the sources of motivation for anti-
immigrant sentiment in economic and social change in late modern welfare 
states: the changing role and functions of the state as guarantor of welfare, 
job stability and security; socioeconomic insecurity caused by the 
restructuring of welfare systems and labour markets; and/or changing or 
declining patterns of collective identification (ibid.). 
 
 When the state no longer keeps its role as the guarantor of the economy, welfare and 
security because of the constrains of globalization, changing international environment 
and demographic change, it tries to find new strategies to gain the support and loyalty of 
the public and re-establish its legitimacy since the states experience a legitimation crisis, 
in which they fail to fulfil the attributed tasks but instead liberalize the markets and cut 
back welfare state expenditures. Therefore, the public is mobilized around other issues, 
namely the unemployment problems, welfare state problems are attributed to the 
immigrant society which shares the finite resources with the indigenous people. 
Moreover, the state control on security is reasserted with the new perceived threats in 
order to create a collective identity for the society and one of the ways to do it, is to 
build this threat around the outsiders including the immigrants and refugees. Namely the 
immigrants are regarded as a threat to the society in terms of collective norms and 
shared culture. Therefore, the negative sentiments of the public towards immigration, 
chauvinist nationalism, hesitancy, hatred and even xenophobia are articulated through 
these means and the European public tend to regard the immigration issue as one of the 
most important challenges that their countries face. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter creation of parallel societies which do not 
have interaction with each other is one the biggest fears of Germany. Germany has the 
largest Turkish population in Europe; hence thoughts of many Germans are shaped 
around their experiences that they have with the existing societies though a process 
where they shape the image of Turks in their minds whether it is true or prejudiced. The 
report of European Stability Initiative on the German Turkey Debate (2006c) argues 
“With the beginning of accession negotiations in 2005 arguments to define the borders 
of Europe historically to exclude Turkey have largely ended. A debate on the borders of 
Europe has been replaced by a much larger debate of stake holders in politics and civil 
society on integration, Islam and European values, and the position of Turkish 
women.”. Therefore the honour killings, violence towards the women among the 
Turkish immigrants make the public think that Islam is hostile and aggressive to women 
and Islamic values are not compatible with the European values. The debates on 
Turkey’s accession focus on these issues considering the opening of borders to the 
Turkish people. 
UK and Germany have been facing with similar pressures as a result of the 
liberalization of their labour migration, however the discourse of the Germans and the 
Britons are different in the sense that they use different rhetoric to display their 
opposition and justify their demands to restrict the free movement. The rationale behind 
the opposition of the German elites and the public includes many concerns such as the 
perceived costs of immigration in terms of economic considerations and cultural 
considerations. From the economic point of view, the Germans believe that after the 
immigration there would be an increase in the competition for jobs, in the supply of 
workers and a pressure on the wages and replacement of the national workers with the 
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foreign labour force. Moreover immigration brings poor performance of the immigrants 
but instead the immigrant population creates pressure on the government.  
In the UK, the economic concerns of the immigration are more pronounced rather 
than the cultural ones while expressing the anti-immigrant sentiments. Cultural 
divergences with the Turkish population are less pronounced in comparison to their 
counterparts living in Germany or France. The Turkish community in the UK are more 
skilled; more integrated to the country, and have a less attachment to the religion or 
traditions. Since the UK public has not faced many challenges arising from the Turkish 
population and their experiences with the Turkish immigrants are different from the 
other European states, they are less concerned about the religious and cultural 
differences but more about the economic costs of the immigration. However, for the 
public of the UK, the immigration may have some costs in terms of the abuse of the 
welfare structure. The public fears of transferring their welfare rights to the immigrants 
and paying more taxes for them. Moreover the concern of the public does not only 
relate to the workers but also to the asylum seekers who are thought to be burden on the 
state. In the UK which seems to be more open to the free movement of workers, there is 
a more acceptance of the employed people than of the asylum seekers who are thought 
to abuse the welfare system of the country (Boswell et al., 2005:2). The UK government 
for instance has been criticized because of the failure of calculating the number of 
potential immigrants from the Eastern member states and underemphasizing the actual 
numbers. Many people saw this as an unsuccessful immigration policy; however the 
reaction to the government was not so strong since the figures illustrate the contribution 
of these immigrants to the economic performance of the UK. 
David Logan (2005), former British ambassador to Turkey, argues that in the 
countries with poor economic performance and high unemployment figures the public 
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tends to be more critical on the arrival of Turkish labour, whereas in the countries with 
low unemployment rates people are more open to the immigrants. The Dutch, French 
and German public are concerned about the economic problems in their country and the 
high unemployment figures. As a result, they refer to these economic problems while 
talking about possible flow of people that might deepen these problems. However 
economic problems are not sufficient to explain the causes of the opposition, also their 
experience with regard to the Turkish immigrants or Muslim immigrants in general 
extended the grounds of opposition. Many Euro Turks reside in Germany, France, 
Netherlands and Austria. In these countries there is also fear of flow of the Turks and 
the public thinks that the accession will bring the risk of immigration by 75% in 
Germany, 65% in France, 61% in Netherlands and 76% in Austria. Austrians are more 
critical on the immigration from Turkey and also they are more critical on the idea that 
Turkey’s accession would favour the mutual comprehension of the European values. 
The Austrians stand against accession since they have concerns about immigration as a 
result the threat to their jobs and the cost of absorbing Turkey (Bowley, 2005). 
Therefore, immigration of the Turks is not a desire but a fear for the majority of the 
Austrians and the anxiety about the possible disturbances in the labour market and 
Turkish culture and Muslim values become the most pronounced reasons behind the 
opposition. There are more than 150,00 Turks in Austria where there are parallel 
societies who do not integrate to each other. For many Austrians Turks represent the 
cultural incompatibility. They have arranged marriages and most of them are underage 
and have traditional family structures with many children. The women are generally 
repressed by the dominant male in the family and cannot adapt to the Austrian culture. 
The children are not good at school, since most of them cannot even express themselves 
in German. Moreover, many Austrians complain about the high taxes they pay for the 
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government because of the fact that Turks work in low-paid jobs and benefit more from 
the social security systems such as the medical treatment and child-support money. 
Therefore, the ideas of the Austrians about the immigrant Turks further their anxiety for 
the acceptance of more Turks. There is also another side of the concerns of the 
Austrians. There are still many people who think within the historical scope and who 
carry the feeling deep inside that Turks are invaders and they were saved from Turkey 
by referring to the Ottoman Vienna sieges and accession of Turkey will mean the 
acceptance of a non-European country to the EU which will destroy the European 
values. 
In Netherlands, the anti-immigrant sentiments among the public has become more 
visible after the political murders of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn  in 2002 and the 
filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 by a Muslim extremist. These events made the 
Dutch people to think about their problems with the immigrants, their tolerance towards 
the foreigners and failure of the adaptation of the Muslims to the society. Because of 
having a huge Muslim population, Turkey’s accession is thought around these issues 
which indicated the failure of the multicultural experience. Netherlands have segregated 
societies which are mainly Moroccan origin. However, Turkish immigrants also have 
problems in being integrated to the host country and the result is the formation of ‘dish 
cities’, which have the houses with dishes outside which are directed to Turkey to get 
the Turkish TV channels.  The fears of the foreigners and the Muslim extremism reveal 
in the issue of possible migration of Turks and further the anxiety of the Dutch about 
the eradication of the European values as a result of the tolerance to the immigrants and 
revival of a threat to internal security. 
The riots in French cities which involved the North African youths, have paved 
the way for the sharpening of the negative feelings towards the immigrants in Europe 
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and as a result Turkey’s accession has become problematic considering the free 
movement of Turks within the European cities and the growing hesitancy in Europe to 
accept more migrants (Dougherty, 2005). Moreover, the unemployment problem in 
France increases the doubts of the French people on the accession of Turkey. Jacques 
Floch, socialist member of the European Affairs Committee says “If people didn’t 
worry about unemployment they wouldn’t worry about outsourcing, about enlargement, 
about immigration or indeed about deregulating European markets some more.” 
(Bennhold, 2005). Therefore, the unemployment in France doubles the political debate 
about the accession of Turkey. 
After giving the main points of the opposition to the Turkish immigration with 
regard to the unemployment problem, experiences with the current immigrants, 
European perceptions about the Turks and the Muslims and lack of elite consensus on 
the immigration issue, it is also important to deal on the indicators of public opposition 
with the statistics provided by the Eurobarometer survey results. 
4.3. European Public Opinion on Turkey’s Accession and Immigration 
Related Issues According to the Surveys 
4.3.1. Public Support for Turkey’ Accession: 
Enlargement is one of the most popular issues in the EU that is being discussed in the 
public sphere and on which the opinion of the public is taken very often. Besides the 
enlargement in general, enlargement to Turkey takes the attention of the European 
public and the support for integration varies according to the countries. Public opinion 
on Turkey’s accession matters because of the perceived costs of the enlargement and its 
identity related implications. In particular, public support to Turkey’s EU membership 
is crucial with regard to the fact that it can determine the outcome of the membership 
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negotiations by means of the referenda on Turkey’s membership that might be held in 
France, Netherlands and Austria before the accession. In order to assess the position of 
the European public, recent Eurbarometer surveys are chosen which ask questions about 
Turkey’s membership, main concerns of the European public and the immigration 
related issues. Therefore, survey results provide a general idea about the public attitude 
and their preferences on the issue of free movement of Turkish people and Turkey’s 
membership.   
Special Eurobarometer survey on “The future of Europe” (2006:55) that was 
carried out in between February and March 2006 illustrates that more than half of the 
Europeans (55%) think the enlargement of the EU in positive terms. As seen in the 
survey results Europeans are not opposed to enlargement in general. Nevertheless, 
opposition to enlargement is felt harder in Turkey’s case. According to the Standard 
Eurobarometer 64 (2005), 31% of the European population support Turkey’s accession 
whereas 55 % oppose it. The old member states are more reluctant to include Turkey 
into the EU than the new member states.  
Although the support for Turkey’s accession seems to increase to 39% in spring 
2006 when European public is asked to decide on the country that they would favour as 
an EU member, Turkey becomes the least favourable state (See Table 4.1.). The 
membership of Bulgaria, Romania and of other states such as Croatia, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Ukraine are supported 
more than that of Turkey. Moreover, there is a far stronger support for the accession of 
the current European Free Trade Area (EFTA) member countries Iceland and in 
particular Norway and Switzerland (See Graph 4.1.). While the greatest support for 
Turkey’s accession is from the Turkish Cypriots by 67%, and even more than Turkey 
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itself (54%), the opponents of the accession are Austria with 81%, Germany with 69% 
and they are followed by Luxembourg, Cyprus and Greece.  
 
Graph 4.1: Support for Enlargement-Tested Countries 
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 As the Eurobarometer surveys show since the enlargement of the EU is 
generally regarded as positive by the European public, the support for Turkey’s 
accession is less than the support for general enlargement and majority of the European 
public oppose Turkey’s membership. Moreover, when compared with some of the 
European states, Turkey has the lowest support and according to the EU citizens, 
Turkish membership must be subject to certain conditions. 
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Table 4.1: European Public Support for Turkey’s Accession 
 Support Opposition 
EU25 39  48 
Belgium  43 55 
Czech R. 32 61 
Denmark 50 44 
Germany  27 69 
Estonia  35 49 
Greece  33 67 
Spain  47 23 
France  39 54 
Ireland  40 32 
Italy  36 49 
Cyprus 26 68 
Latvia  35 47 
Lithuania  33 42 
Luxembourg  24 69 
Hungary  44 46 
Malta  35 31 
Netherlands  55 42 
Austria  13 81 
Poland  51 31 
Portugal  37 30 
Slovenia  53 41 
Slovakia  33 55 
Finland  42 55 
Sweden  60 33 
The UK 42 39 
 
 
Turkey  54
 
22 
Bulgaria  47 26 
Croatia  58 28 
Romania  66 7 
         
  Source: Special Eurobarometer 255, July 2006 
 
4.3.2. Immigration as an Obstacle to the Accession 
The European public support for Turkey’s accession is low. It is important to consider 
the reasons of the hesitancy of the European public towards Turkey’s membership 
which make it least favourable even among the non-candidate states although it is an 
EU candidate and has already begun to the accession negotiations. According to the 
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European public, there are some obstacles on the part of Turkey which make the 
accession difficult such as the human rights issue in Turkey, the economical problems, 
the issue of immigration after the membership and the cultural differences between 
Turkey and the EU. 84% of the Europeans think that Turkey should respect to human 
rights and 76% believes that it is necessary for Turkey to improve its economy in order 
to be an EU member in ten years (Standard Eurobarometer 63, 2005).  
As shown in the Graph 4.2, 54% of the respondents agree that the cultural 
differences between Turkey and the EU member states are too significant to allow for 
this accession and most of the Europeans disagree with the idea that the accession 
would favour the mutual understanding of the European and Muslim values.  
 
Graph 4.2. European Public Opinion on the Conditions for Turkey's Accession
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Whereas the public in Sweden, Poland and Hungary has more positive view about the 
mutual understanding of Muslim and European values, Greeks and the Austrians have 
the most opposition voices.   
The causes of the opposition to Turkey’s membership differ, but immigration 
becomes one of the most vital elements in the growth of the public hesitancy towards 
the membership. One of the most important concerns of the Europeans after Turkey’s 
human right records and economic development is the immigration issue. Immigration 
of Turkish people to the more developed EU member countries after the accession is 
regarded as a risky issue by the Europeans. 
According to the survey 63% of the Europeans believe that Turkey’s accession 
brings the risk of immigration to the more developed countries in the EU. While 
Romania (39%), Lithuania (47%), Luxembourg (44%) and the UK (52%) have the 
lowest support in the EU-27 to the idea of the risk of immigration, Cyprus (82%), 
Austria (78%) and Greece (77%) are the three states that show the biggest commitment 
to the idea that after the membership, the immigration will be a risky issue for the 
Europeans because of the flow of Turkish people to the other EU member countries. 
According to the Eurobarometer, surveys 54% of the French oppose Turkey’s 
membership, and the French opponents mostly cited the risk of massive migration from 
Turkey and the idea that Turkey is not in Europe with a large Muslim population (Pope, 
Biefsky, Champion, 2004). Therefore, the doubts about the immigrants and the further 
immigration make the public more hesitant towards enlargement. 
Moreover, related to the topic of immigration, a small percentage of the European 
public, representing just 29% of the EU-25 population replied that ‘Turkey’s accession 
would favour the rejuvenation of an ageing European population’ and %50 of the 
respondents opposed the statement. Within the EU-25, Slovenia, Denmark, UK and 
 71
Spain show the biggest support to the idea but with 34% of the population and it is only 
Turkey between the EU-27 and the candidate countries who thinks that Turkey’s 
accession will help to the ageing population of Europe.  
Therefore, it seems that the accession of Turkey is seen as a problematic issue 
initially in terms of its human rights records and economy which are understandable 
problems with regard to the fact that these two credentials are the necessities of the 
accession for all the members as stated in the Copenhagen Criteria. However, the data 
presents us that the public does not only concern about the fulfilment of these criteria 
for the membership, but there are other issues that they see as risky, and immigration is 
one of the most important causes of the doubts of the Europeans.  
Another important reason for the hesitancy to the membership is the cultural 
differences between the EU and Turkey and this relates to the immigration from the 
cultural perspective in the sense that the Europeans are not wiling to open their borders 
to the culturally different nationals and Turkey’s accession will lead to the flow of 
culturally different people to the European cities where they may have integration 
problems (see Table 4.2). However, while the proponents of Turkey’s accession and the 
free movement of Turkish people generally focus on the needs of the ageing population 
of Europe and claim that the dynamic, young population of Turkey will be a remedy for 
an ageing Europe, the European public does not share the same idea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 72
Table 4.2: Public Opinion on the Immigration of Turks 
 
  
Turkey’s joining 
could risk favouring 
immigration to 
more developed 
countries in the EU 
 
Turkey’s accession 
would favour the 
rejuvenation of an 
ageing European 
population 
EU25 63 29 
Belgium  70 28 
Czech R. 69 25 
Denmark 75 33 
Germany  71 31 
Estonia  76 25 
Greece  77 24 
Spain  58 33 
France  68 26 
Ireland  52 25 
Italy  57 28 
Cyprus 82 23 
Latvia  64 23 
Lithuania  47 18 
Luxembourg  44 27 
Hungary  67 24 
Malta  58 22 
Netherlands  59 27 
Austria  78 21 
Poland  63 33 
Portugal  55 33 
Slovenia  67 34 
Slovakia  68 24 
Finland  79 28 
Sweden  57 28 
The UK 52 32 
     
Turkey  65 74 
Bulgaria  59 27 
Croatia  63 32 
Romania  39 23 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 63, Special Eurobarometer 255 
 
The perceptions of Europeans and Turks differ to a large extent on the benefits of the 
growing young population of Turkey as an alternative for the ageing European 
population. Therefore, the immigration of the Turks is not considered as beneficial in 
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terms of its contribution to solve the problems of the European states that arise from its 
demographic structure. 
4.3.3. Costs and Benefits of Immigrants to the Society 
The immigration of Turkish people is not welcomed by the European public. However 
learning the perceptions of the European public on immigration is important to 
understand why immigration is a debatable topic in Europe which attracts the concerns 
of the public. The Eurobarometer 63 (2005) provides data about the most important 
issues that the public thinks they face at the national level. The major concerns of the 
public are unemployment and economic situation and these concerns are followed by 
other problems: crime, healthcare system, inflation and immigration. Immigration is 
labelled as an important anxiety of the member states by 14% of the population, but 
European public does not fear the same threat from the other issues such as terrorism, 
defence and foreign affairs. Moreover the EU-15 members seem to be more critical on 
immigration issue than the new members, and the concern is the highest in the UK, and 
Denmark. It is crucial to underline that the UK is one of the three states who opened 
their borders to the Eastern European workers from the time of accession and where the 
government is favouring immigration because of the economic benefits that they might 
provide. 
The views of the European public on the immigration issue are also shaped by 
their perception about the immigrant societies in their countries. Therefore, if the public 
believes that immigrants provide benefits for the host society they tend to be more open 
to the immigration, however if they regard the immigration as costly they become more 
hesitant towards the migrants and migration. In this context, Standard Eurobarometer 66 
(2006) asks for the ideas of the European public on the contribution of the immigrants 
to their country. 40% of the respondents agree with the proposition that ‘Immigrants 
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contribute a lot to our country’ whereas 52% oppose it. Therefore majority of the 
European believes that the migrants do not contribute to the host countries.  
The surveys on the issues with regard to Turkey’s accession and immigration 
provide us a perspective about how the European public thinks about Turkey’s 
accession from the free movement perspective. Thus it is seen that while more than half 
of the European public support the enlargement of the EU in general, Turkey is the least 
favourable state among the previous candidates and other potential members because 
Europeans think that Turkey should have progress in specific areas, such as the human 
rights, economic development, as always stated by the European leaders and even by 
Turkish decision makers. But what is important is that, the public also regards 
immigration issue as a risky for the accession of Turkey as the other two credentials and 
this represents the European public’s fears of potential Turkish immigrants. 
Immigration is seen as one of the major concerns of the member states after the 
economic problems and more than half of the Europeans believe that immigrants do not 
contribute to their society and Turkish accession will not help to the rejuvenation of an 
ageing European population. Therefore, according to the European public the costs of 
the immigration outweigh its benefits. 
4.4. Conclusion  
In consequence, immigration becomes one of the main areas on which the opposition of 
the public to Turkey’s accession is noticeably seen. As the larger literature on 
immigration and public sentiments towards the immigrants points up and the survey 
results illustrate, the accession of Turkey becomes problematic considering the 
hesitancy of the European public towards foreigners. This hesitancy is based on various 
factors such as the economic problems in the country, the experiences with the 
immigrants and as a result perceived costs of the immigration on the economy, culture 
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and security. The opposition of the European public to the immigrants has also been 
examined in the debates on the application of free movement rights to the Central and 
Eastern European workers. The concerns of the Europeans about the cheap competition 
from the new members were symbolized with the symbol of ‘Polish plumber’. 
However, Turkey’s case becomes more complicated and the public opposition is higher 
for the movement of Turkish labour. Immigration seen as a risky and challenging issue 
for the Europeans, since the public is not very satisfied with the idea of living with 
Turks because of many reasons. But why the public is so hesitant to Turkish 
immigrants? Turkey is large, poor and predominantly Muslim. Besides the economic 
based considerations such as the flood of Turkish people and their negative impacts on 
the labour markets, other cost and benefit analysis with regard to the impact on welfare 
systems, and cultural identity of the European public there rest other explanations as the 
motivation of hesitancy. First, in comparison with the Central and Eastern European 
member states, Turkey’s membership is a more popular issue which takes the attention 
of the media with an emphasize on the negative consequences of the immigration. 
Secondly, generally there is not an elite consensus on Turkey’s case and the political 
party cleavages become more visible in the discussions on Turkey. The right-wing 
parties are more diffident towards the immigration and the European elites tend to 
mobilize the public on the opposition of the Turkish immigrants to increase their votes 
and they use the anti-enlargement and anti-immigration rhetoric in the election 
campaigns. Thirdly, while talking about immigration of Turks, European public tends to 
think in relation to the past experiences with the other Turkish immigrant populations in 
their country who are not well integrated to the host country and who keep their 
religious and cultural attachments. Therefore the integration problems of the immigrants 
and the failure of the multicultural societies in Europe, find its reflection on the attitudes 
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towards the free movement issue.  Finally, the rising extremism in Europe, which is 
exemplified by the rise of criminality, and terrorist acts are generally attributed to the 
Muslim populations and to their affiliation with terrorism. Moreover considering that 
Muslim societies have historically been the other of Europe, Muslim identity of Turkey 
generates an obstacle to the free movement. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS POSSIBLE 
MIGRATORY FLOWS 
 
 
 
The concerns of the European public and the European elites about the free movement 
of Turkish people in case of Turkey’s membership are studied in the previous chapters 
from different perspectives such as the economy, security and culture. The basis of the 
concerns does not always have to reflect the real issues, since they are perceived by the 
various segments of the public. This chapter therefore moves beyond the perceived 
assumptions or justifications of the attitudes towards the issue of enlargement and free 
movement. It tries to present the predictions, from the migration studies of the scholars 
and economists, about the number of potential immigrants to the EU if and when free 
movement of persons principle applies to the Turkish workers or contrarily in case of 
the failure of Turkey’s membership prospects. Moreover, by taking account of the 
future demographic structure of Turkey and the EU, the chapter deals with whether the 
movement of Turkish workers can contribute to the European labour markets by being a 
remedy for the ageing and shrinking European population. 
5.1. Provision of Free Movement of Persons Between Turkey and the EU 
In order to fully understand the issue of migration between Turkey and the EU, one 
needs to go back to the 1963 Ankara Treaty. Ankara Agreement which is known as the 
EEC-Turkey Association Agreement laid down the basic principles for the 
strengthening of economic relations and envisages the establishment of customs union 
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between Turkey and the EC. In addition, the Additional Protocol of 1970 detailed the 
arrangements and foresaw the time table for the establishment of the customs union in 
three phases. Ankara Agreement also included a provision for gradual granting of free 
movement rights to Turkish workers. With regard to the free movement of persons, 
Article 12 of the agreement states that  “The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by 
48, 49, and 50 of the Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of 
progressively securing freedom of movement of workers between them” (Association 
Agreement, 1977). Furthermore, Article 36 of the Additional Protocol (1977) states: 
   Freedom of movement for workers between Member States of the Community 
and Turkey shall be secured by progressive stages in accordance with the 
principles set out in Article 12 of the Agreement of Association between the end 
of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry into force of that 
Agreement. The Council of Association shall decide on the rules necessary to that 
end. 
As the article states, free movement of persons was aimed to be established between 
November 1974 and November 1986. However, in 1976 Turkey announced that it could 
not decrease the tariff barriers within the scheduled time. Although the reciprocal 
lowering of the EC tariffs is foreseen in the Additional Protocol, in 1982 the 
Commission suspended the closer relations between EC and Turkey and the rights of 
the Turkish citizens to free access to the European labour markets were not 
implemented (Martin, Midgley and Teitelbaum, 2001). 
Although the customs union was established on the decided date of 1996, it did 
not include any provision for the free movement of persons principle. The rights of the 
immigrant workers and their families are guaranteed under the national legislation of 
the member states to some extent, but the right to free movement has never been 
achieved even though it is foreseen in the agreement and its additional protocol (Melis, 
2001). There are 3.5 million Turks that reside in the European countries and 70% of this 
population rest in Germany. The status of the Turkish immigrants in the member states 
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is guaranteed by the EC-Turkey Association Council established with the Association 
Agreement, bilateral agreements between the states which cannot grant less rights than 
those provided in the Association Agreement. Moreover, the case law is developed by 
the European Court of Justice which interprets the rights and extends its scope through 
different cases brought by the immigrant Turks in the member states. Therefore Turkish 
immigrant workers enjoy broader scope of rights than third country nationals in the EU 
but without the rights to move freely to take up employment within the EU territory.  
Having dealt with the documents that define the free movement of rights of Turks 
in the past, making projections on the potential migratory flows by the time of the 
application of this right is also important. 
5.2. Projections on Turkish Immigration 
The studies on Turkey’s accession deals with the possibility of massive immigration 
from Turkey to the more developed EU member states. This is claimed by the 
opponents of free movement and is emphasized by most of the European public and the 
leaders since there is a great debate on the free movement of Turkish workers both at 
the elite level and the public level. Therefore it will be beneficial to present the 
literature with regard to the estimation of migration from Turkey in order to make 
feasible assumptions about the migratory flow and its impact on the receiving countries. 
5.2.1. Possible Migratory Flows from Turkey to the European Union: 
The number of the potential Turkish immigrants after the application of free movement 
of labour principle cannot be predicted with any certainty. Migration depends on many 
variables such as the differences in the income levels, employment opportunities in the 
countries, the institutional arrangements for the movement as the guest-worker 
agreement or application of free movement. Hence there are pull and push factors that 
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motivate immigration or decrease the pressure on the potential immigrants. Pull factors, 
the features that attract immigrants to other countries, are: “better living conditions and 
wages, other people’s experience with migration, good employment prospects and more 
individual freedom” and push factors which lead to leave the home country because of 
the issues related to the domestic problems include the relatively worse economic 
conditions of the home country and ethnic problems (Krieger, 2004). Moreover the 
factors that affect immigration do not only involve economic considerations, but there is 
also the social perspective which comprises the culture, language, geographical distance 
and social networks and they can be both an incentive or an obstacle to move (Flam, 
2003). For instance, although free movement is guaranteed within Europe for many new 
members, the mobility is not massive since there are other barriers in front of the 
movement such as the differences in language.  
The methodology used for the immigration forecasts varies from econometric 
methods based on the immigration experiences of the emigrant country before and after 
the accession considering the pull and push factors for the immigration, projections 
arise from the past experiences of the other enlargements and opinion polls conducted in 
order to measure the ideas of the people on the likelihood to leave their country 
(Commission Staff Working Document, 2004). 
In this context, the arguments about the migration potential of Turkish nationals in 
case of the membership can be based on two basic arguments. First one relates to the 
assumption that there will be massive flood of Turkish people to the EU after the 
accession because of the low income levels, wage differentials, poor economic 
performance of Turkey that will drive the people to move to more developed countries. 
This idea is very common in the European public and even in many European leaders as 
described in the previous two chapters. Since Turkey is very populated and the fertility 
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rates indicate that it will continue to grow in population and there is a significant 
unemployment problem in the country, the number of immigrants is thought to be 
doubled. However, the second scenario assumes that the movement of Turks with the 
application of free movement principles will not be in large scales as feared by the 
opponents of accession.  After the enlargement, the pressures on the movement of the 
Turkish people will decrease and as a result most of them will not feel the need to 
migrate because of the progress in Turkey both in economic and social terms. The 
report of the high level group of the Directorate-General for Employment and Social 
Affairs (2004) addresses that the past examples of immigration showed that as the pull 
and push factors become less differentiated and there are more economic and social 
development in the new members, although the wage levels are different between the 
member states, this does not lead to major movements. Therefore, less people tend to 
move to another country. However, in case of the failure of membership there would be 
more immigration to the more developed states of the European Union.  
Considering the migration trends in Turkey and its past experiences, Turkey has 
traditionally been a sender country to the Western European states since the early 1960s 
with the bilateral agreements between Turkey and the European states especially with 
Germany, France, Austria and Netherlands. Between 1961 and 1975 the number of 
immigrants reached 805.000 and after bringing to an end the acceptance of immigrant 
workers, immigration has continued with the family reunifications and family 
formations (Toksöz, 2006: 217-218). Daniel Gros (2005) argues that even under the 
strict migration regime of the EU member states, the annual net migration of the 
Turkish people equals to 35,000 which is the difference between inflows and outflows 
of the immigrants, generally in the form of family reunification and family formation. 
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The study of Erzan, Kuzubaş and Yıldız (2004) on the magnitude of potential 
immigration from Turkey to the EU which is calculated according to Turkey’s past 
experience with regard to the immigration from Turkey to Germany for the period 
1967-2001 presents two scenarios: first is with an assumption that Turkey will enjoy 
high growth rates and the rights to free movement will be granted in 2015; the second 
scenario assumes a worse condition and is based on the assumption that  Turkey’s EU 
membership is suspended and Turkey experience lower development figures with 
higher unemployment  rates. The alternative growth scenarios for Turkey are developed 
by examining the demographic developments as states in the UN population 
projections, internal migration; unemployment; productivity and urban and rural growth 
(see Table 5.1).    
Table 5.1. High Growth Scenario for Turkey, 2005-2030 (annual values) 
Urban GDP Growth 0.065
Urban Productivity Growth 0.03
Rural GDP Growth                                                              0.02
Unemployment-2015 Urban                                                   0.13 
Average                                               0.09   
Unemployment-2030 Urban                                                   0.05 
Average                                               0.04 
 
Source: Erzan, Kuzubas, Yıldız (2004), Growth and Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU 
 
In the first scenario the result is within the range of 1 to 2.1 million immigrants 
between 2004 and 2030 because of economic and social benefits of the accession for 
Turkey such as the motivation for economic growth in the country, decreasing 
unemployment rates, increasing respect to human rights (ibid.) (see Table 5.2). 
In the other case, if membership fails, free movement principle does not apply to 
Turkish labour, and the current visa regulations are kept, but the pressures for the 
movement increases. Therefore, this scenario results with the immigration of more than 
2.7 million people despite the restrictions on the free movement of labour.  
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 Table 5.2. Immigration Scenarios for Turkey in 2004-2030 
Net Change in the 
Turkish Migrant 
Population 
         
2004-2015 
 
2015-2030 
 
Total 
High Growth-
Membership-Free 
Movement of 
Labour 
 
246.000 
 
1.888.000 
 
2.134.000 
Lower Growth-No 
Membership-No 
Free Movement of 
Labour 
 
760.000 
 
1.974.000 
 
2.734.000 
 
Source: Erzan, Kuzubas, Yıldız (2004), Growth and Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU 
 
As the authors argue the scenario which is based on the failure of the membership 
is very risky since it leads to flow of more migrants than it would be in the case of 
membership with free regulations. The suspension of the accession of Turkey may lead 
to larger flows than in the case of membership because of the lower growth and 
relatively higher unemployment rates in Turkey since the EU has a role in the 
stabilization and consolidation of democracies and it encourages the economic 
development in the member states. Therefore, if implementation of the reforms for the 
economic and social development does not keep the same speed, there can be a loss of 
stability and this will create more pressure on the migration of the nationals. Kirişçi 
(2003) argues:  
   A Turkey that is left outside to meet the challenges of democratization and 
globalization alone, next to an increasingly unstable Middle East, may fall 
into the grasp of pressures to emigrate legally, illegally, or through the 
asylum track. At that point, it is unclear how well Turkey would be able to 
continue its traditional act of balancing between emigration and 
immigration. 
 
 84
 Therefore, not only legal migration may be in larger scales, but there can be an increase 
in the illegal migration if the free movement is not allowed and this would increase the 
scale of the underground economy in the member states. 
There are some other projections about the immigration of Turks to the EU, 
prepared in the very beginning of the 2000s and these projections assume that Turkey 
was to gain the free movement rights in 2005 or in 2010 which seems to be too early 
when looked from today’s perspective. The study assumed that 25% to 35% of the 
working age men would seek jobs in the EU in the initial wave, but the later waves of 
the immigration depend on the labour market situation of Europe (Martin, Midgley, 
Teitelbaum, 2001:602). If after the first wave of immigration, there are still jobs in the 
European labour markets for the Turkish workers, more people will tend to move, 
otherwise the immigration figures will tend to fall because of the lack of better 
employment opportunities in the other EU countries. Therefore, if the immigrants are 
generally unskilled, migration trend towards the west will be short-lived by eliminating 
the doubts on the massive flow of the Turks since the number of jobs that require 
unskilled migrants will tend to decrease in the near future and unskilled people will 
have difficulty in finding jobs abroad (ibid. 603). Moreover, some of the experts predict 
lower level of immigration even if there are employment opportunities in the EU 
members since the posts that are filled by the Turks in Europe are generally “difficult, 
dirty and dangerous, living outside Turkey was expansive and there was discrimination 
against Turks” and these are discouraging factors to emigrate (ibid. 602). 
Harry Flam made a forecast of the migration potential from Turkey between 2000 
and 2030 based on the population and GDP growth rate assumptions for this period. The 
forecast is only formulated around the immigration figures to Germany since there is a 
lack of data for the whole of the EU. Germany has been the main receiving country for 
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the Turkish workers and can verify close assumptions about the Turkish migration 
trends (Flam, 2003:17). The forecast is founded on the assumption that every year 1, 2 
or 3% of the per capita income gap between Turkey and Germany is closed.  It is 
assumed that there is a higher GDP per capita growth rate than it has been in the late 
1990s, and this growth will be 9, 12 or 15% in the initial years and 3% at the end of the 
period of 2000-2030 (ibid.). Considering these possible economic developments in 
Turkey and the population estimations, GDP growth rate and the decrease in the income 
gap, immigration is thought to be 2,2 million in 2000 and it ends with 3,5 million new 
immigrants, if there are no restrictions on the free movement of people (ibid.). 
Therefore the result is the immigration of 3,5 million of Turks to Germany. However, 
Flam presupposed that free movement is granted by the year 2000 which is proven to be 
an early date for the membership and the calculation is made for the following 30 years. 
However, the forecast does not seem to be a realist one from today’s perspective 
considering the indefinite date of Turkey’s membership if there will be, and given that 
the free movement rights to Turkey will not be applicable right after the accession. 
Another important implication of the accession and free movement of persons is 
the return migration. As experienced with Spain, Greece and Portugal there may be a 
reverse migration by some Turkish immigrants who have already been living in the 
member states and who may choose to return to Turkey because of the developments in 
Turkey. However in the failure of the economic and political developments which can 
be linked to the failure of membership prospects, it will be difficult to expect a 
noteworthy return migration. The econometric models of immigration forecasts do not 
make real predictions about the political problems or slow down of the reform process 
in the sender country in case of the failure of the membership. However, the political 
problems and security related problems increase the pressure on the society and lead to 
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further migration. As a result, economically and politically more stable and developed 
country will attract more people to Turkey. For instance, the results of a survey, made 
by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel (2005:66) on the Turks in France and Germany, 
show that 30% of the Turks think about returning to Turkey when Turkey becomes an 
EU member. 
On the other side some of the major cities such as Kocaeli and Istanbul may 
benefit more from the investment opportunities of the enlargement and experience 
larger growth. As a result this may lead to the creation of jobs within country and 
internal migration from the rural areas to the more developed parts of the country. 
Moreover, the linguistic and cultural problems and the social affiliation of the people 
with the society create reluctance to move, since generally people do not tend to leave 
their relatives if they do not have serious considerations. The Commission report 
“Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective” (2004), states that the number 
of the Turkish immigrants does not only depend on the development of the income 
levels in the country and filling of the gaps between Turkey and the EU. From the social 
perspective linguistic and cultural barriers impose an obstacle for the movement. 
Therefore, the economic developments and investment opportunities may increase the 
intraregional mobility rather than the mobility within the EU. As the Eurobarometer 
surveys indicate (2002), although 6.2% of the Turkish population has a general 
inclination to move to the EU countries, only 0.3% of the people have the firm intention 
to move. The intention to move is the highest among the young of 18-24 age group 
(Krieger, 2004). 41% of the people, who have a general inclination to move to the EU, 
specified the work reasons while 34.9 mentioned financial reasons as a motivation for 
emigration. Therefore as seen in the surveys, the trend of migration is generally derived 
by economic motives. 
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Hughes (2004) estimated the potential migration for Turkey which is based on the 
study of DIW institute on the migration potential from the Central and Eastern 
European members and Bulgaria and Romania to the EU-15 and which assessed the 
migration of 286,000 for the initial term and 3.7 million as a total stock. Hughes 
considered that Turkey would be poorer than these states at the time of accession if it 
became a member in 2015. If Turkey had similar determining factors on migration, 
considering its population of 82 million when compared with the 104 million people of 
the CEECs, the migration figures would be 225,000 at the outset with a total stock of 
2.9 million which is equal to the 0.5% of the total EU-28 population in 2025 (ibid.) 
Lejour, Mooij and Capel (2004) prepared a research for the estimation of the 
migration potential from Turkey based on its past immigration patterns by applying the 
data to the income differentials between Turkey and the EU for the assessment of the 
impact of income disparities on the immigration as also done in the migration 
projections for the free movement of the Central and Eastern European workers. By 
taking account of the future demographic developments such as the rise of the Turkish 
population to 86 million in 2015 and of the economic developments such as the 
decrease in the income differential between Turkey and the EU, they reached a 
conclusion that there is a possibility of 2.7 million Turkish immigrants moving to 
Europe in the longer term, namely 15 years after the accession (ibid.). Moreover they 
assume that distribution of the immigrant population will not be even, but as a result of 
the network effect which leads to the movement of people into the countries where their 
relatives reside, Germany will be the main destination of the immigrants by 76% which 
is equal to more than 2 million of Turks and Germany will be followed by France by 
8% and Netherlands by 4% (see Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.3: Expected Destination of Turkish Immigrants in Europe 
 
Total 2665 (in 1000) 100 (in %)
Germany 2025 76
France 2013 8
Netherlands 107 4
UK 53 2
Italy 27 1
Rest of Europe 240 9
  
Source: Lejour, Mooij and Capel, 2004, Assessing the Economic Implications of 
Turkish Accession to the EU 
 
 Turkey has higher fertility rates when compared with the European member 
states and the working age population is too large. However, the employment rate of the 
working age population is too low and also female population shows the lowest 
participation to the labour market which decreases the labour productivity in the 
country. Therefore, although the growing population generally leads to the formation of 
a dynamic and young generation who can display an immense economic performance 
and increase productivity, employment opportunities of Turkey do not promote the 
labour productivity. As the OECD report on Turkey indicates Turkey has an enormous 
potential to sustain the labour productivity and labour utilisation performance, but it 
needs some structural reforms to increase the employment performance such as the 
reform in the education system, agricultural system and overcoming the duality in the 
formal and informal sector by formalizing informal enterprises (OECD Economic 
Survey of Turkey, 2006). Since this reform process is also encouraged by the EU and 
the membership opportunity becomes a motivational force in order to make economic 
and social reforms, in the future the employment opportunities may increase in Turkey 
and this may end up with less people seeking jobs in the EU.  
 As seen in the studies, the experts do not agree on the number of the potential 
immigrants from Turkey. The immigration estimations range from 0.5 million to 4.4 
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million and this number is equal to the 0.7% of the EU-28 population which is assumed 
to be more than 570 million in the 2020s (Barysch, 2005:8). Considering this number of 
potential migrants, the public fears about the occupation of the European labour markets 
by the Turkish immigrants seems to be exaggerated (Belke, 2004:291). It is also 
important to deal with another dimension of the Turkish immigration besides the 
estimation of number potential migrants and this is the impact of the immigrants on the 
EU labour markets. 
5.2.2. Can Turkish Migration be a Remedy for the Ageing European 
Population? 
The potential migration of Turkish workers to the EU is thought to have different 
implications in the sense that migrants may be remedy for the aging European 
population by filling skill shortages of the European population or contrarily cause 
further unemployment in the host countries and become burden on the society. From 
one perspective, in the future, Europe will need additional workforce because of its 
demographic indicators which tend to shrink; the decrease in the population will be 
serious for the working age population and in this situation, movement of Turkish 
people will have a complementary impact. However, since the need for unskilled labour 
force is largely met by the Central and Eastern European workers, European markets 
will be in need of more qualified labours. Therefore, from the other perspective 
Turkey’s accession may bring many unskilled people into the European Union even 
though there is not a demand for it and as a result, this will further the European 
unemployment problem. However, since Turkey has been developing its education 
system, the number of educated and skilled people will increase and not only 
disqualified people, but also qualified people will tend to move to Europe because of the 
better job opportunities in Europe. And the scholars point out that the economic impact 
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of the free movement of Turkish labours on the EU will depend on skill composition of 
the immigrant workers. 
The assumptions on the impact of immigration on the EU member states bring the 
question of whether immigration can be a solution for the shrinking and aging European 
population. The fertility rates in Europe are dropping and life expectancy increases 
which will lead to the population decline and creation of an older Europe. As stated in 
the United Nations Replacement Migration Report (2000), Europe is facing with the 
challenge of a declining and ageing population (see Table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.4: Population Figures for Turkey and the EU for 2003-2050 
  
Population Dynamics (in thousands) 
 2003 2015 2025 2050 
Turkey 71 325 82 150 88 995 97 759
Germany 82 467 82 497 81 959 79 145
France 60 144 62 841 64 165 64 230
UK 59 251 61 275 63 287 66 166
Italy 57 423 55 507 52 939 44 875
Spain 41 060 41 167 40 369 37 336
Poland 38 587 38 173 37 337 33 004
Romania 22 330 21 649 20 806 18 063
Netherlands 16 149 16 791 17 123 16 954
EU-25 454 187 456 876 454 422 431 241
EU-28 (inc. 
Turkey) 
555 743 567 842 570 832 552 318
Turkey as % 
of EU 28 
12% 14.4% 15.5% 17.7%
 
Source : UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and 
Independent Commission on Turkey 
 
 
Although Europe will keep its growth in the following decade, the population will 
start to decline after 2025. As the Green Paper on Migration (2005) states, from the five 
big countries of the EU, only Britain and France will have population growth between 
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2005 and 2050. Even in the new member states Bulgaria and Romania the forecasts 
show negative growth rates.  
However, the demographic figures of Turkey differ from EU27 and candidate 
country Croatia. Turkey has an increasing population despite the decrease in the fertility 
rates and the annual growth of its population is 1.1%. Between 2005 and 2030 the 
population of Turkey is predicted to rise by more than 19 million and by the year 2050 
Turkey is expected to have more than 97 million people and after 2015 its population 
will probably exceed the population of Germany (Vatanen, 2006). 
 Since birth rates decrease, but life expectancy increases for the European people, 
if the migration is not allowed, many European states will face with the decline in the 
population size in the future and the decline is faster in the working age population (see 
Graph 5.1). As the UN report on migration (2000) indicates, in the longer term the 
problem of the ageing European population should be addressed with economic, social, 
political policies and programmes. The report proposed three strategies to cope with the 
decreasing population of the working age: avoiding the early pensions system, 
incorporating some certain groups such as the women into the working life and 
integrating the existing migrants while developing strategies to let the international 
migration for compensating the declines in the size of the population, especially in the 
size of the working age and supply the demands of the labour markets (ibid). Ferguson 
(2004) states: 
   By 2050, one in every three Italians, Spaniards and Greeks will be 65 or 
over, “even allowing for immigration. Europeans therefore face an 
agonizing choice between "Americanizing" their economies, i.e., opening 
their borders to much more immigration, with the cultural changes that 
would entail, or transforming their union into a fortified retirement 
community. 
 
The aging population has many negative consequences such as the reduction of 
the ratio between the working age populations of the age 15-64 and the population 
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above 65 years old. By 2030 there will be additional 40 million elderly people, but the 
number of children will fall by 8.8 million (Rösh, Özdemir, 2005). Therefore, the 
decrease in the working age population will also decrease the economic productivity 
and the increase in the elderly retired population will mean an additional burden on the 
society especially on the working age population. Until 2030, the EU will be in need of 
20.8 million people of working age population and the dependency ratio will rise from 
49% to 66% meaning that three active persons will have to take care of two inactive 
people, while it was four in 2005 (ibid.).  
 
 
Graph 5.1. Ageing European Population: Distribution of the EU-25 population 
according to the age groups (1950-2050) 
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Source: UN World Population Prospects (2002 Revision) and Eurostat 2004 
Demographic Projections  
 
 
The Green Paper of the Commission on “Confronting demographic change: a new 
solidarity between the generations” (2005:5) dealt with the demographic problem of 
Europe and its implication for the future of Europe by stating that:  
 93
   Never in history has there been economic growth without population 
growth. Increasing productivity, in particular through access to lifelong 
learning, and increasing employment participation, in particular by creating 
a real European labour market and a higher level of occupational mobility, 
are two important ways of doing this, as are increasing the birth rate and 
immigration. 
 
Therefore, immigration is proposed as one of the necessary ways to increase the 
productivity. Immigration in general have positive economic impacts by its contribution 
to the employment and economic growth as seen in the US example who experienced 
an economic boom in 1990s by means of the immigrants who have changed the ageing 
population figures of the EU to a large extent (European Commission, 2003). The 
contributions of immigrants to the sustained economic growth are also observed in 
Ireland.  
One of the reasons for the fear of immigration is the thought that immigration may lead 
to higher unemployment which is already seen as a problem in many European 
countries. Will the Turkish immigrants increase productivity or lead to further 
unemployment in the receiving states? It is hard to reply since the immigration studies 
are based on restrictive assumptions and but not definite calculations. However, as the 
Commission states (2003:11), by and large the immigration does not lead to 
unemployment, on the contrary it can have positive effect on the domestic employment 
since it helps to make the labour markets flexible which adjusts to the increase in the 
supply of workers. Immigrants do not always take the jobs in the host countries, but 
they also create jobs by being entrepreneurial regarding that many Turkish immigrants 
in Europe have established their own business. 
However, as the British government claims the positive contributions of the 
immigrant societies to the economic development depend on effectively management of 
the immigration flows. Therefore the effects of the Turkish immigrants will be positive 
when they are complementary rather than supplementary to the native workers and if 
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they fill the gaps of the labour markets. Explicitly in a country where the population is 
highly skilled and the market needs to be fulfilled by the lower-skilled or unskilled 
workers, the movement of Turkish workers carrying those qualifications will increase 
the productivity and also will increase the wages in the country (Flam, 2003:12). 
Moreover unemployment depends on the skill composition of the immigrants; when the 
skill composition of the immigrants are complementary to those of the nationals and 
immigrants do not displace the national workers, then immigration may not create 
unemployment and may increase the productivity in the economy. However it is 
important to avoid the creation of segregated labour markets as a result of fulfilling a 
specific sector with the migrants which will create a dependency to migration to fill that 
sector in the future (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, since the labour forces will shrink in many member states in the 
next decades which may lead to slow economic growth in Europe, Turkey would 
provide human capital with its growing population and therefore, European countries 
will benefit from letting Turkish workers migrate rather than keeping them out 
(Barysch, 2005). Labour migration will help the Union to reduce the shortages in the 
labour market such as the shortages for the skilled people in the area of information and 
communication technologies, advanced technologies or health services on the one hand, 
but on the other hand there may be need for the low-skilled people in some sectors such 
as the construction sector. Skilled immigrants may help the host countries to specialize 
in some areas and have competitive advantage; alternatively less skilled or unskilled 
immigrants may also contribute to the society by lowering the costs of goods and 
services as a result of working for lower wages and doing the jobs that the native 
workers hesitate to do (Vatanan, 2006). 
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Although it is difficult to make assumptions about the skill composition of the 
potential immigrants, it is important to consider that young generation is more willing to 
move. In this context two scenarios are produced by Lejour, Mooij and Capel (2004). In 
the first assumption the immigrants are skilled since the education level is increasing in 
Turkey and more people are getting higher education, the other assumption predicts that 
all immigrants are unskilled since the workers in agricultural sector have a risk to be 
unemployed after its restructuring. If all the immigrants are primarily unskilled, the 
wage inequality rises in the EU with a decline in the wage of unskilled workers, but the 
effects of migration for the EU-15 are generally small in economic terms. Therefore, an 
expected inflow of 2.7 million Turkish migrants would reduce the GDP in Turkey by 
between 1.8% and 2.2%, but the GDP increases in the EU-15 by between 0.5% and 
0.7%; however, it is assumed that the income in Turkey will rise while it falls in the EU 
by increasing the wage inequality in the EU-15 if the migrants are unskilled (ibid.). 
Kirsty Hughes (2004:18) argues if Turkey becomes an EU member in 2015, but 
the free movement of workers is applied after 2025, the migration of the Turkish labour 
will depend on the relative income levels and the employment conditions 20 years from 
now. Therefore, in that condition Turkey will have a young and skilled workforce while 
there is an increasing need in the European labour markets, but Turkey will still be 
poorer when compared with the EU average and skilled people may also migrate. 
Migration of skilled people would mean a remedy for the skill constraints of the ageing 
European population.  
The opponents of immigration claim that free movement will depress wages. 
Brücker (2002:34) argues that the impact of migration on the wages is measured 
between -0.3 and +0.3% and this impact is generally negative for the unskilled since 
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replacement of the workers by the new comers is more probable. However the impact of 
migration on the wages is positive for the high-skilled workers.  
People who have a negative stance towards the impact of the accession of Turkey 
and letting the Turks move in the member states, generally do not consider the decrease 
in the working age population in Europe but overemphasize the costs of immigration by 
disregarding the contributions of the immigrant societies to the receiving states for the 
longer term. Although immigration cannot be regarded as a permanent remedy for the 
aging population, it provides the states some relief in making adjustments (Erzan, 
Kirişçi). Therefore, it seems that immigration is one of the ways to respond to the 
demands of the aging European population by alleviating the labour market shortages in 
the near future and a driving force to make the labour markets function effectively 
which may have the risk of slowing growth. 
5.3. Conclusion 
The flow of Turkish people if and when the free movement rights are granted cannot be 
predicted with any certainty since the migration potential depends on various factors 
which are defined as pull and push factors in the immigration studies such as the income 
differences, wage differentials, unemployment rates. But the social networks, past 
migration trends of the country, culture, language and geographical proximity are also 
important in the decision to move. However, since it is difficult to predict the statistics 
about the developments in the economy or even it is harder to make predictions about 
the social motivations of the immigration, the projections about Turkey rest on 
restrictive assumptions and do not present the real figures, but provide a perspective 
about the immigration potential and the impact of the immigration on the member states 
by taking account of various factors, developing econometric models or by conducting 
surveys to measure the willingness of the people to move.  
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The predictions about the number of immigrants differ in different studies. 
However, losing the membership prospect may end with more immigrants in the future 
both in terms of legal and illegal workers and this would have more negative impacts on 
the society. On the other side, the anticipation of membership provides Turkey the 
motivation to develop economic and political reforms since the EU contributes to the 
stability in the accession states. As a result the pressure on the migration of people will 
decrease to a large extent as many Turks have economic motivations behind their 
intentions to move. Accession negotiations will have a positive impact on the Turkish 
economy which will be a driving force for further economic reforms initiated for 
economic growth, maintaining macroeconomic stability and reduction of unemployment 
in the longer term. Since at the time accession Turkey will conform to the EU 
legislation and will fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, many obstacles on the trade between 
Turkey and the EU will be resolved and the shortcomings of the customs union will be 
removed with complying with the rules of the internal market. However the failure of 
the membership may lead to the collapse of Turkey’s reform process and this would 
lead to instability and political unrest in the country. 
The migration generally contributes to the economic prosperity of the host 
countries if it is managed. Scientific research done both in Turkey and Europe 
demonstrates that immigration of Turkish people may boost European economy. 
Therefore not only Turkish, who may have a wishful thinking about the membership, 
estimate that there will not be a mass flow of immigrants to the EU, but also many 
European researches agree on the idea that Turks may not flood en masse and Turkish 
immigrants may contribute to the European economy. Considering the ageing and 
declining European population and which is more seriously felt in the working age 
population, Turkey’s accession can provide the human resources to fill the needs of the 
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labour markets of the other member states. It is important to note that immigrants do not 
have to be unskilled as it has been in the previous Turkish immigration. Since Turkey’s 
population is being more educated and more skilled, immigration of skilled people can 
also be expected who will contribute to the overall economic performance of the EU. 
Therefore, although the transitional arrangements help the member states to calm the 
populist fears in their countries, this transitional period may lead to the suspension of 
the economic benefits of migration. Considering the situation of the EU labour markets 
with ageing workforce and skill constraints which will be felt more seriously in the 
future, the member states may become more open to encourage the migration and the 
political attitude can change in the member states towards a more flexible migration 
policy. However, it is important to keep in mind that Europe will have to face with the 
problems of ageing population on the one hand and unemployment on the other, with or 
without Turkey, and integration of Turkey will just provide a relief for the short term 
while creating efficient solutions to its economic problems. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Turkey’s possible accession to the European Union has increased the debates about its 
impact on the Union and the challenges of the enlargement since Turkey is a large, 
relatively poor country with a predominantly Muslim population. Moreover Turkey is 
assumed to be culturally different with a different role in the identity formulation of the 
Union than the already acceded members or the candidate countries. The preferences of 
the member states have an important role to play during the enlargement and all the 
debates about the membership of Turkey are very much shaped around the perceived 
costs and benefits of the accession, preferences of the member states and their 
expectations from Turkey’s membership. However, member states preferences are 
formulated in the domestic politics where the public opinion has an effective role to 
play in the decision making process.  
The debates about accession of Turkey do not only revolve around the fulfilment 
of the Copenhagen Criteria and the adoption of the acquis. The utility concerns of the 
member states and the public come together with the identity based concerns on the 
immigration issue. Immigration is one of the most sensitive areas where the hesitancy of 
the Europeans around these concerns arise and it is reflected to the opposition to 
Turkey’s accession. Turkey’s possible membership becomes problematic considering 
the concerns of the public and the leaders about the impact of immigration of Turks on 
labour markets, European culture and security. In this context the immigration issue 
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poses a pressing challenge for both Turkey and the European Union. Free movement of 
persons issue is a pressure for the EU since on the one hand, there is a Lisbon strategy 
by which the EU aimed to be the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world 
by the year 2010 and this will be possible by making the economy more efficient, filling 
skill shortages and immigration is a good opportunity to relieve from the pressure on the 
European labour markets. On the other hand there is a growing hesitancy of the public 
towards the foreigners within the member states and even an increasing xenophobia 
especially towards the Muslims. Europe’s demographic trend shows an alarming bell 
with a shrinking and ageing population, which is more serious in the working-age 
group, but Europe is also facing with an unemployment problem. As the unemployment 
figures rise and people have more economic considerations, the Euroscepticism, anti-
immigrant and anti-enlargement sentiments also rise among the European public.  
The European leaders face with the pressure of the public in the domestic politics 
with regard to the free movement issue and this becomes stronger in Turkey’s case. The 
idea of free movement is sensitive for many member states because of the fears of a 
large-scale immigration. Free movement of Turkish workers is seen as a benefit for the 
EU as a whole and a remedy for an ageing Europe by many Turkish and European 
researches. However, the majority of the European public thinks that free movement 
would be a burden on the member states. Opening of borders would lead to mass flow 
of people to European job market and cause structural unemployment which is also a 
problem for Europe today. Furthermore, migration would lead to replacement of the 
national workers, decrease wages because of the flow of the unskilled workers who 
work with lower remuneration, and create additional burden on the governments 
because of the social benefits they seek. Moreover, besides these economic 
considerations, identity of Turkey becomes an important issue to affect the opinion of 
 101
the public and the leaders on immigration. Considering the existing problems with the 
immigrant populations in Europe and the failure of the integration policies, migration of 
a Muslim population causes doubts for the European elites and the public. Social 
concerns are based on the idea that immigrants would lead to social and cultural 
problems and cause disturbances in the society since Turks have a different way of life, 
different culture and religion. The European public and the leaders fear about the 
furtherance of the integration problems after the movement of Turks. The opposition to 
Turkey and the free movement of Turks is higher in the countries with the largest 
immigration population such as Germany, France, and Netherlands. Since the Turkish 
and even Muslim immigrants in Europe play an important role in the formation of the 
public attitudes towards the immigrants and further immigration, it seems that the 
assimilation and integration problems in Europe, creation of ‘parallel societies’ as in 
Germany or ‘dish cities’ as in Netherlands find its reflection on the issue of Turkey by 
making the accession more difficult. Therefore it becomes inevitable to question to what 
extent the failure of the multicultural societies can be an obstacle for the free movement 
of Turks and if the failure of the multicultural societies also gives the signals of a failure 
of a multicultural EU. 
Considering the demands of the European labour market and the future forecasts 
for the European population on the one side, the public opinion which highly opposes 
the movement of Turkish workers on the other side, European leaders face with a 
dilemma. While some of the leaders tend to mobilize public around the opposition to the 
immigration issue in order to divert the hesitancy of the public towards other structural 
problems such as the unemployment, they also think about the upcoming elections and 
the need to get the support of the public by taking account of public considerations. 
Since the public opinion matters for the democratic legitimacy, the public sentiments 
 102
against the free movement, market led demands and the election concerns of the 
decision makers complicate the issue of Turkey’s accession from the migration 
perspective.  
Some European governments such as Austria and France have shown their 
intention to hold a referendum and consult the issue of Turkey’s membership to the 
public, after the governments decide on the accession. The European public states the 
immigration of Turks as one of the major obstacles in front of the accession after the 
human rights and economic issues. If the systematic respect to human rights increases 
and the economy improves in Turkey, would the cultural differences be less visible? 
The immigration is a challenge for Turkey’s accession since the issue involves other 
actors besides Turkey. Turkey may develop its human rights records and provide an 
economic growth with political and economic reforms and may decrease the pressure on 
the emigration of Turks, but it is beyond the scope of Turkey’s efforts to alleviate the 
fears of the Europeans on the identity based consideration. But it has to do with the 
European leaders and the public and it is up to the European leaders to ease the negative 
public sentiment in order to respond to the demands of the aging European population 
by making the public know about the positive consequences of the immigration and by 
providing elite consensus on the immigration issue.  
The European Commission declared that the immigration has contributed to the 
economy of the member states such as UK, Sweden, and Ireland who opened their 
borders to the Central and Eastern European workers from the beginning of accession. 
Moreover the Commission encourages the mobility within the Union, and declared 
2006 as the ‘European Year of Worker’s Mobility’ with an aim of increasing the 
awareness of the benefits of free movement of persons. Since the EU does not have a 
supranational policy, but general guidelines and immigration policies fall in the scope of 
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the authority of the member states, it is highly possible that after the accession Turkey 
will face with restrictions on the free movement of labour. However, as the econometric 
analysis suggest the immigration from Turkey to the EU member states would not be in 
large scales since Turkey’s reform process in economy, politics and social life may 
decrease the pressure on the migration considering the long negotiation period. In case 
of the failure of membership the number of immigrants in terms of both legal and illegal 
workers, may be higher than it would be in the case of accession, because of the slow 
down of the reform process in Turkey. Moreover, since the skill composition of the 
Turkish people changes in time and more people get higher education, the immigration 
from Turkey may not only include non-skilled workers.  
Free movement of persons is one of the basic principles of the EU and after the 
accession, member state nationals are granted this right maybe with some derogations 
and transitional measures. Without doubt it is not possible to deny the free movement 
rights to the Turkish workers in the case of membership except the provisional 
restrictive measures. The abolishment of the free movement forever is contrary to the 
spirit of the Treaties between Turkey and the EU such as the Association Agreement 
and Additional Protocol which determine the rights of the Turkish immigrants. Also, 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2000 provides the citizens 
freedom of movement and of residence within the territory of the member states in the 
Article 45 and provides equal rights by respecting to cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity with its Article 22. Therefore, although it is highly probable that the Turkish 
workers will not have the free movement rights immediately, if this right is suspended 
forever, it will be a discrimination and as a result a second class membership which is 
strictly opposed by the Turkish leaders. 
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With or without Turkey, Europe will face with its own problems with regard to 
the integration of the immigrants, finding efficient solutions for the unemployment 
problem and developing reforms for economic growth despite the pressure of the 
population trends. Turkey’s membership will help the member states to relieve from the 
problems of the EU labour markets while dealing with long-term solutions. As the 
pressures on the labour markets increase in the future and are more felt by the 
Europeans, the member state governments and the public would be more open to the 
immigration of Turks which partially offers a solution for the efficient functioning of 
the European markets. 
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